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I
Introduction
On January 1, 1984, the world's largest privately held corporation, American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T),
was split into eight separate corporate entities, thus culminating the largest divestiture action in American legal history.'
This divestiture was effectuated pursuant to a consent decree
entered in January 1982 between AT&T and the United States2
Department of Justice in settlement of a 1974 antitrust suit.
This 1982 decree (generally known as the Modification of Final
Judgment or MFJ),3 modifying an earlier decree, was entered
by the court following a quasi-Tunney Act proceeding. 4 Its effect was to separate AT&T's exchange telecommunications operations,5 which were presumed to be natural monopolies, 6
from other services and businesses in which AT&T partici1. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 145 (D.D.C.

1982); affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) [hereinafter
AT&T]; 1 DECISION TO DIVEST; MAJOR DOCUMENTS IN U.S. v. AT&T, 1974-1984 I-1, 121 (C. Sterling, J. Kasle & K. Glakas, eds., 1986); The Federal Telecommunications
Policy Act of 1986: Hearingson S. 2565 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation,99th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1 (1986) (Statement of Mark S. Fowler,
Chairman, FCC).
2. The consent decree is appended to the AT&T decision. See Modification of
Final Judgment in Civil Action No. 82-0192, 552 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1982) [hereinafter MFJ].
3. The MFJ was initially proposed as a modification of an earlier 1956 consent
decree, discussed infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text, and submitted to the New
Jersey Court in which the 1956 consent decree had been entered. Following a hearing
before Judge Harold H. Greene in the Washington, D.C. District Court, the entire case
was transferred to the District Court for the District of Columbia. The term "Modification of Final Judgment" derives from the fact that the decree in effect modified the
judgment entered in the 1956 consent decree in New Jersey. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at
140-41.
4. The Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)-(h) (1986), provides pre-approval procedures whenever the government settles an antitrust suit via a consent decree. Because the MFJ was in essence a modification of the earlier decree entered by another
court, it was never determined whether the Tunney Act itself actually applied.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 143-44 n.52.
5. As discussed irnfra notes 17-21 and accompanying text, the term "exchange
telecommunications" can have a variety of meanings even though it is considered to
be a term of art. Generically, the term means the provision of telecommunications
services within a geographic area denominated as an exchange.
6. A natural monopoly exists when economies of scale of a single producer increase over the full range of product demand. See infra note 41 and accompanying
text. Some aspects of exchange telecommunications services may meet this definition
today, while others clearly do not.

1986]

THE MFJ: JUDICIAL OVERKILL

pated. AT&T's exchange operations were divided among seven
Regional Bell Holding Companies (RBOCs or BOCs),7 and its
other competitive operations-primarily long distance service
and manufacturing of telecommunications equipment-remained with AT&T itself. The MFJ also freed AT&T from
line-of-business restrictions contained in the earlier consent decree,8 and precluded the divested BOCs from engaging in practically any business other than the provision of exchange
telecommunications service.
The MFJ concluded long and protracted litigation between
the Department of Justice (Department) and AT&T. This litigation had consumed significant resources and managerial talent of both the Department and AT&T. It involved scores of
attorneys, economic experts, and other professionals. The discovery process involved hundreds of thousands of documents
and hundreds of managers devoted full time to searching files
and reviewing, cataloging, and indexing documents. The litigation diverted a significant amount of the attention of top executives of AT&T and the Department; the MFJ put an end to this
costly process.
The MFJ also had the potential to increase competition substantially by dramatically reducing, through divestiture of approximately seventy percent of its assets, AT&T's market
power in the national telecommunications marketplace. However, the MFJ also imposed numerous restrictions on the business operations which the seven newly-created exchangeservice companies could provide-including injunctive provi7. The term RBOC denominates the holding companies which came into existence under the divestiture and which own the stock of the twenty-two divested Bell
Operating Companies (BOCs). At times, particularly in the context of applicability of
the MFJ's injunctive provisions or federal regulatory rules, the term RBOC is used to

encompass a Regional Bell Holding Company and all of its affiliates. In this document the authors do so for the sake of simplicity and do not intimate that the legal

differences between a BOC, which by definition provides exchange telecommunications service, and its shareholders are not significant. However, these differences are
beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., US WEST, Inc. v. FCC, 778 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.

1985). The appellate court recognized that US WEST is a corporation which does not
provide telephone service. Id. at 25, 28. See also Competitive Impact Statement of the
Department of Justice in Connection with Proposed Modification of Final Judgment

in Civil Action Nos. 74-1698 and 82-0192, United States v. Western Elec. Co. (D.D.C.),
reprintedin 47 Fed. Reg. 7170, 7173 n.13 (Feb. 17, 1982) [hereinafter Competitive Impact Statement].
8. See supra note 3 and infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the restrictions imposed on AT&T in the 1956 consent decree which terminated a

1949 antitrust action brought against the Bell System.
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sions prohibiting the BOCs from competing with AT&T itself.9
In this regard, the MFJ has proven to be seriously anticompetitive. It has also had the unusual result of vesting a United
States district judge with control over many key aspects of national telecommunications policy already entrusted by statute
to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) .1
In evaluating the anticompetitive aspects of the MFJ, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the MFJ was a limited
agreement conceived of and drafted by AT&T and the Department of Justice to settle an antitrust lawsuit. 1 While the MFJ
was approved by the district court and thus is enforceable as an
order of the court,'2 it is not a public law enacted by dulyelected public legislators. Yet, because of the pervasive nature
of the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions, the Department and
the district court now effectively regulate the entire telecommunications industry in the United States.' 3 The line-of-business restrictions in the MFJ do not represent the consensus of
the American public, Congress, or the federal or state administrative agencies charged with regulation of the telecommunications industry. In fact, the MFJ does not even represent a final
judgment by a court on a full record after trial.
This article argues that the injunctive provisions of the MFJ
which restrict the scope of the lawful business operations of the
BOCs are unwise, anticompetitive, and unnecessarily duplicative of the present statutory authority of the FCC, which is
charged by statute with formulating and enforcing federal telecommunications policy. In support of this proposition, this article attempts to trace the origin of some of the more significant
9. MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 227.
10. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 143; MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 231.
11. See the dissenting opinion of now Chief Justice Rehnquist in Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1004-05 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), the Supreme
Court memorandum affirmance of the AT&T decision.
12. See MFJ, 552 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1982). A consent decree, however, unlike a
traditional judicial order, derives its effectiveness from "the agreement of the parties,
rather than the force of the law upon which the complaint was originally based.
Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3076 (1986).
13. The Department of Justice now recognizes that this situation is not tenable,
and publicly supported S. 2565, a bill introduced in the Senate of the United States by
Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.), which would return regulatory jurisdiction over interstate telecommunications to the FCC. See The Federal Telecommunications Policy
Act of 1986: Hearingson S. 2565 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transportation,99th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1 (1986) (testimony of Douglas H. Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice).
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anomalies in the MFJ as currently applied. It then suggests
some potential bases for analysis which can provide a framework for returning the telecommunications market to a position where the salutary and pro-competitive aspects of the MFJ
can be retained without the unnecessary substantive and procedural baggage which now burdens the MFJ, and which prevents the divested BOCs from being full participants in the
emerging information services marketplace. Because state regulatory authority tends to complement the basic federal
scheme reviewed herein and FCC regulation is so closely intertwined with the policies and objectives of the MFJ, this article
14
discusses only the federal statutory program.

II
Antitrust Background to the Divestiture
Antitrust disputes between AT&T and the Department of
Justice date back to the late nineteenth century.15 However,
the antitrust theories which underpin the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions are of recent origin and the markets 1 6 which
these line-of-business restrictions address did not even exist in
a meaningful fashion when the action that resulted in the MFJ
was filed. To put the MFJ in proper perspective, it is thus initially important to understand several basic elements of telecommunications technology and the pre-divestiture operations
of the former Bell System.
Since the MFJ is rooted in a perceived technological difference between exchange service and interexchange service, 7 it
14. In the ensuing discussion, we focus on federal regulation of telecommunications under the Communications Act of 1934. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1986). It must
be noted, however, that the FCC's jurisdiction extends only over interstate services
and facilities. Intrastate services are subject to regulation by regulatory agencies established by all fifty states. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 152(b), 221(b) (1986). The authority of
the FCC to preempt inconsistent state regulatory authority is broad, but not unlimited. See Computer and Communications v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1984); Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 106 S. Ct. 1890
(1986).
15. See infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
16. This article utilizes the generic term "markets" to include both product markets (e.g., telecommunications equipment) and service markets (e.g., exchange telecommunications services). In fact, technology in telecommunications has developed
in such a manner that there is often no realistic distinction to be drawn between product and service markets. For example, a customer may purchase switching service
from an exchange carrier, or may purchase a piece of premises switching equipment
from an equipment vendor.
17. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 141-42, 170-73.
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is important to understand the distinctions between the two.
The MFJ's basic premise is that there is a market-based difference between telephone exchange service and interexchange
service, and that a provider of exchange service can be logically
(and legally) limited to that market alone. Thus, the MFJ basically limits the divested BOCs to businesses which relate to
what are called in the MFJ "exchange telecommunications
services."
The exchange/interexchange concept originally derives from
the Communications Act's recognition that customers pay for
local telephone service in a different manner than they pay for
service to more distant locations.'" Exchange service is defined
in the Communications Act as "service within a telephone exchange.., which is covered by the exchange service charge."' 9
The average consumer would perceive exchange service as defined in the Communications Act as that telephone service
within a limited geographic area wherein calls are paid for
either at a flat monthly charge or a measured charge which is
uniform throughout the area. The Communications Act counterpart to interexchange service as defined in the MFJ is "toll
service," defined in the Act as "telephone service between stations in different exchange areas for which there is made a separate charge not included in contracts with subscribers for
exchange service. ' 20 Toll service is traditionally equated with
long distance service. These concepts do not describe separate
service markets in today's telecommunications environment in
which, especially for large customers, toll and exchange service
often are indistinguishable. In essence, exchange service under
the Communications Act is nothing more than service within
an area defined as an exchange by a regulatory agency. 2 '
The MFJ also relies on the perceived distinction between exchange and interexchange telecommunications services. However, the traditional definitions of exchange and interexchange
services were discarded fairly quickly in the actual implementation of the MFJ, which ultimately defined exchanges to be
something quite different from what they are under the Com18. Id. at 173.

19. 47 U.S.C. § 153(r) (1986).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 153(s) (1986).
21. Regulation of exchange services is generally reserved to the states. See 47

U.S.C. § 221(b) (1986).
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munications Act.22 Nevertheless, the basic assumption which
underpins the MFJ is that the markets served by exchange and
interexchange service providers are totally discrete, and that
all interexchange telephone calls by definition utilize the services of an exchange carrier at both ends of the call. Thus, the
MFJ's essential dividing line for divestiture purposes was
drawn based on a perceived distinction between competitive interexchange services and noncompetitive exchange services.
Prior to divestiture, AT&T was the dominant national supplier of both exchange and interexchange telecommunications
services, as well as the dominant manufacturer and provider of
telecommunications equipment. 23 Through control of the thenexisting twenty-two Bell Operating Companies, plus controlling interests in Southern New England Telephone Company
and Cincinnati Bell, it provided exchange service to approximately eighty percent of the population of the United States.24
Through AT&T's Long Lines Department, it provided the vast
majority of nationwide interexchange services.25 AT&T also
owned one hundred percent of Western Electric Company, the
dominant manufacturer of telecommunications equipment,
and, in partnership with Western Electric, one hundred percent
of Bell Telephone Laboratories.26
As discussed below, the Department of Justice's general uneasiness with the antitrust implications of AT&T's dominant
position in the national telecommunications marketplace dates
back to the nineteenth century. However, it was not until quite
recently that AT&T's dominant position in providing both exchange and interexchange services was seen as the major antitrust concern which ultimately found expression in the MFJ
In fact, the competitive interexchange market which the
MFJ's line-of-business restrictions purport to protect did not
even come into existence in a meaningful way until after the
lawsuit which led to divestiture was well under way.
22. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of what the MFJ

deems an exchange.
23. Telecommunications equipment includes both central office equipment
(equipment integral to a communications carrier's network) and terminal equipment
or customer premises equipment (CPE) (equipment located on a customer's premises). The MFJ defines these two types of telecommunications equipment differently.
See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 228-29.
24. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 171 n.170.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 135-36.
27. Id. at 139 n.20, 160-62.
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The First Antitrust Case and the "Kingsbury Commitment"

By 1894, the original Bell patents had expired, and AT&T
had acquired the Western Electric Manufacturing Company
and achieved control over most of what would become the
BOCs.28 During the late 1800s and early 1900s, when other
companies competed with what was already known as the Bell
System, AT&T often responded through what became known
as a "merger policy"-the acquisition of the stock of "independent" telephone companies. 9 In 1913 this method of competition employed by AT&T was challenged in the first federal
government antitrust suit against the Bell System. 30 A Sherman Act complaint was filed by the Department of Justice in
the United States District Court, District of Oregon.3 ' In that
case the Department sought to dissolve the Bell System in the
northwestern portion of the United States.
That suit (and other complaints raised with the Department
by independent telephone companies) resulted in negotiations
between the Attorney General of the United States and the
President (Theodore Vail) and Vice President (N. C. Kingsbury) of the Bell System. Kingsbury wrote a letter to the Attorney General on December 19, 1913, containing what
amounted to the first consent decree. Based on the stipulations
28. See Defendants' Third Statement of Contentions and Proof, Vol. I, at 110-11,
120-21, 138, in Civil Action No. 74-1698, United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.
(D.D.C. filed Mar. 10, 1980). Dr. Alexander Graham Bell was granted the patent for
"Improvements in Telegraphy" on March 7, 1876 [U.S. Patent No. 174,465]; and in
January 1877, Dr. Bell was granted a second patent covering the basic telephone instrument [U.S. Patent No. 186,787]. Id. at 96. The negotiations culminating in the
purchase of the Western Electric Company by the American Bell Telephone Company (the early parent of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company) were
concluded on July 14, 1881. Id. at 120.
29. "Independent" companies refers to exchange telephone companies not owned
by AT&T. Such purchases were not unusual. Several industries, including the railway, oil, and tobacco industries, historically experienced the same type of consolidation. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Northern Securities Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197 (1904).
30. Prior to 1913, a variety of private state actions had challenged these and other
Bell practices. See Defendants' Third Statement of Contentions and Proof, supra
note 28, at 132-39, for a comprehensive review, including case law, of the state regulatory structure for this time period. See also Plaintiff's Third Statement of Contentions and Proof, Vol. II, at 1793-96, in Civil Action No. 74-1698, United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co. (D.D.C. filed Jan. 10, 1980).
31. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., Equity No. 6082 (D. Ord. 1913). See
also Defendants' Third Statement of Contentions and Proof, supra note 28, at 164.
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and commitments in that letter, the lawsuit was dismissed.3 2
The Kingsbury letter, later known as the Kingsbury Commitment, contained three major provisions. Specifically,
AT&T: (1) completely divested itself of its entire holdings in
Western Union Telegraph Company (which provided what is
known as "record communications" or "message telegram service"); 3 (2) agreed to permit the independent telephone companies to connect their toll (interexchange) services over
AT&T's lines; and (3) agreed to no longer acquire (directly or
indirectly) any independent telephone companies competing
with AT&T.3 4 Of these three commitments, the first and second continue to this day: Western Union remains separate
from AT&T and independent telephone companies interconnect with both AT&T and the now divested exchange carriers.
The third was modified by statute in section 221(a) of the Communications Act. 5
B.

The Second Antitrust Action and the 1956 Consent Decree

The next significant action by the Department of Justice
against the Bell System was commenced in 1949 in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The
complaint in this proceeding focused almost entirely on
AT&T's control of the telecommunications equipment manufacturing market through its Western Electric subsidiary, and
generally sought divestiture of Western Electric in order that
"the business of manufacturing telephones and telephone apparatus and equipment for the Bell System be completely and
perpetually separated from the business of operating telephone
service in the Bell System. . . ,,13The Department also requested that Western Electric be required to divest itself of its
32. See AMERICAN TEL. AND TEL. Co. 1913 ANNUAL REPORT, 24-26. A consent
decree was signed in 1914. United States v. AT&T, 1 Decrees & Judgments in Federal

Antitrust Cases 483 (D. Ore. 1914). See also Defendants' Third Statement of Contentions and Proof, supra note 28, at 164-66.
33. The term "record communications service" generally means the type of service traditionally provided by telegraph companies. In 1974 the Communications Act
was amended expressly to recognize this definition. Pub. L. 93-506, § 2, 88 Stat. 1577
(1974).
34. Letter from N.C. Kingsbury, Bell System Vice President, to J.C. McReynolds,
Attorney General (Dec. 19, 1913)
35. See 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1986).
36. See Complaint of United States, United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc.,
No. 17-49 (D.N.J. filed Jan. 14, 1949) [hereinafter 1949 Complaint].
37. 1949 Complaint, supra note 36, at § VII, 8.
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fifty percent interest in Bell Telephone Laboratories. 3 8
Seven years later, in 1956, AT&T and the Department agreed
to settle the litigation on the basis of a consent decree bearing
little resemblance to the relief requested in the original complaint.3 9 Instead, AT&T agreed to refrain from engaging in any
business other than "the furnishing of common carrier communications services."40 Western Electric also agreed not to manufacture equipment "which is of a type not sold or leased or
intended to be sold or leased to Companies of the Bell System,
for use in furnishing common carrier communications services .... "41 The Bell System was also required to license its
patents to all applicants subject to detailed terms set forth in
the consent decree itself.4 2 Essentially, the integrated Bell System agreed to limit its activities to the provision of regulated
common carrier telecommunications services. It was presumed
at the time the 1956 consent decree was entered into that these3
4
AT&T services were to constitute natural monopoly services.
C.

The AT&T Divestiture Action

The Department of Justice's third complaint against the Bell
System was filed in 1974 in United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. This complaint, as had the 1949 complaint, focused on Western Electric and sought to require
AT&T to divest its stock in Western Electric. The complaint
further requested that Western Electric itself be required to
divest sufficient assets "to insure competition in the manufacture and sale of telecommunications equipment. ' ' 44 The com38. Id.
39. See 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956) [hereinafter 1956 Decree].
40. See id. at 71,137. "Common carrier communications services" were defined

as: "[C]ommunications services and facilities, other than message telegram service,
the charges for which are subject to public regulation under the Communications Act

of 1934 ...(which] would be subject to such regulation thereunder if such a service or
facility were furnished in interstate commerce .... Id. at 71,137.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 71,139-41.
43. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. See also Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 7, at 7,171; AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 137-38. See also OFFICE OF PLANS
AND POLICY, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER SERIES No.
11, DIVESTITURE AND THE SEPARATE SUBSIDIARY REQUIREMENT, 3-4 (1984) ("the

[1956] Consent Decree ratified the status quo, sanctioning AT&T's monopoly but
preventing its expansion into other industries.").
44. See Complaint of United States at Prayer for Relief 4, United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (No. 74-1698) [hereinafter
1974 Complaint]. See also AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 162-63, 165-66.
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plaint also noted newly emerging competitive market forces on
the periphery of the telecommunications services market and
charged AT&T with attempting to stifle competition from a variety of these new competitors-described as "specialized,"
"miscellaneous," "radio," and "domestic satellite" carriers. 45
The 1974 complaint further requested that AT&T be required
"to separate some or all of the Long Lines Department of
AT&T from some or all of the Bell Operating Companies as
may be necessary to ensure competition in telecommunications
service and telecommunications equipment. ' 46 However, the
1974 complaint, unlike the detailed proposed restrictions in the
1949 complaint, did not suggest that any entity which might result from such a divestiture be prohibited from entering any
market.
The 1974 complaint, while continuing to focus on manufacturing and equipment markets, thus specifically recognized
emerging competitive market forces in the provision of telecommunications services. However, it is important to note that
the complaint neither contemplated nor demanded the entry of
competition into the public switched network 47 then controlled
by AT&T. Rather, AT&T was charged in 1974 with impeding
competition in four highly specialized and limited communications services- one of which, radio common carriers, competed
directly with the Bell System in providing what are traditionally viewed as exchange services.
Trial commenced in 1981 and AT&T moved for dismissal at
the conclusion of the government's case. This motion was denied on September 11, 1981,41 and AT&T began its defense
shortly thereafter. However, prior to completion of AT&T's
case, on January 8, 1982, AT&T and the Department of Justice
45. 1974 Complaint, supra note 44, at § VI, 29. These services were described as
competitive with AT&T's "private line" services. Id. at § V, 16. See infra notes 96100 and accompanying text for a discussion of private line services. While "radio" service was obviously not new, competitive radio common carriers were a new
development.
46. 1974 Complaint at Prayer for Relief 5, supra note 44; AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at
151-53.
47. The "public switched network" was generally perceived as the universal
switched voice network-which combined AT&T's long distance service with exchange services provided by the BOCs and independent telephone companies. See
infra notes 88-124 and accompanying text.
48. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981).
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announced that the lawsuit had been settled.49 This settlement
was approved by the court after a lengthy proceeding conducted under the procedures established in the Tunney Act.5 °
On January 1, 1984, the AT&T divestiture was effectuated.
AT&T's exchange service operations were consolidated in the
existing twenty-two Bell Operating Companies (which also had
provided interexchange service within state boundaries) and
the stock of the Bell Operating Companies was spun off into
seven holding companies. 51

III
Entry and Terms of Modification of Final
Judgment
The MFJ as signed and presented to the court on January 8,
1982, lifted the 1956 consent decree's restraints on AT&T, required AT&T to divest its stock in the twenty-two Bell Operating Companies, and placed numerous line-of-business
restrictions on the soon-to-be-divested companies. While
AT&T was to become free to enter any business, the new restrictions precluded the BOCs from:
1. [P]rovid[ing] interexchange telecommunications services or
information services;
2. [M]anufactur[ing] or provid[ing] telecommunications products or customer premises equipment (except for provision of
customer premises equipment for emergency services); or
3. [P]rovid[ing] any other product or service, except exchange
telecommunications and exchange access service, that is not a
natural monopoly service actually regulated by tariff.52
The proposed MFJ also required the divested BOCs to implement equal exchange access. This required them to offer to
AT&T's long-distance service competitors, as soon as reasonably practicable, facilities, and procedures for access to local exchange distribution facilities on approximately the same terms
(e.g., prices) and conditions as were available to AT&T.53
It is readily apparent that these restrictions had little to do
49. See Ma Bell's Big Break-up, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 18, 1982) at 58-59; MidnightDeal,
TIME (Feb. 2, 1981) at 59.
50. See supra note 4 for a discussion relating to procedures established in the An-

titrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)-(h) (1986).
51. Cincinnati Bell and Southern New England Telephone Company were not
divested under the MFJ. See also supra notes 7 & 24 and accompanying text.
52. MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 227-28.
53. Id. at 225-26, 232-34.
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with the 1974 complaint, a fact highlighted by the MFJ's injunction against BOC provision of "information services",5 4
which bore no relationship to any aspect of the lawsuit. The
information services industry was described as marked by the
participation of many of America's industrial giants 55 and there
was no evidence that AT&T had even participated in the information services business. Nevertheless, it was assumed that
this industry would be jeopardized by BOC participation and
the BOCs were precluded from providing these services.5
After reviewing comments filed by AT&T, the Department
of Justice, and numerous other interested parties 57 in the quasiTunney Act proceeding, the district court, on August 11, 1982,
issued its findings regarding the proposed consent decree. 5
The court required several modifications to the decree, including the addition of provisions that the operating companies be
permitted to market (but not manufacture) terminal equipment,5 9 and to provide written directory advertising, ° and that
a divested operating company be permitted to enter any new
line of business on a showing that there would be "no substantial possibility that it could use its monopoly power to impede
competition in the market it seeks to enter. '61 This latter modification reflected the basic legal proposition that the restrictions on entry into lawful businesses were directly
anticompetitive and could be imposed only if there was a substantial possibility of abuse of any residual BOC monopoly
power. 2
AT&T and the Department agreed to these modifications
and several others, including a seven-year prohibition on
AT&T's entering the electronic publishing business and retention by the court of the power to approve in advance the plan of
reorganization to implement the MFJ. 3 The MFJ was entered
54. See infra notes 125-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nature of
"information services".
55. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 178-79.
56. Id at 189-90.
57. Comments were received from over two hundred such parties, including ser-

vice and product suppliers, regulatory agencies, trade organizations, and public interest groups. Id at 145-47.

58. Id. at 151-53.
59. MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 231. See also supra note 23.
60. MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 231.

61. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 225.
62. Id. at 186-88.
63. Id. at 180-86; MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 231-32.
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as an Order of the Court on August 24, 1982."
Thus, the MFJ as approved by the district court essentially
limited the divested BOCs to the provision of exchange telecommunications and exchange access services, the provision of
terminal equipment and written directories, and nothing else. 6
The entire theory of the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions was
that a firm which provided natural monopoly local exchange
services should be precluded from all other businesses.e However, despite the vast importance of these line-of-business restrictions to the substance of the MFJ, by the time it was
entered by the court, these essential philosophical and legal
premises on which the line-of-business restrictions were
based- that antitrust policy could be enforced by strictly limiting the BOCs to the provision of natural monopoly exchange
services- had already been contradicted by the MFJ itself.
The Department of Justice viewed the control of monopoly
exchange facilities as the root of all anticompetitive evil in the
telecommunications marketplace, reasoning that such control
required all telecommunications users and suppliers to rely on
bottleneck exchange facilities. 7 Based on this premise, the Department argued that, if an exchange service provider also engaged in competitive businesses, monopoly local exchange
revenues would be utilized to advance unfair competition
through cross-subsidization of competitive services.s
However, the Department and AT&T ignored this premise in
defending the proposed MFJ by insisting that AT&T itself
could not be precluded from the local exchange marketplace.
64. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 131.
65. The proposed MFJ defined the term "exchange access" as "the provision of
exchange services for the purpose of originating or terminating interexchange tele-

communications." Id., 552 F. Supp. at 228-29. "Exchange telecommunications" was
not defined in the MFJ itself.
66. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 186-95. See also Competitive Impact Statement,
supra note 7, at 7,179-80. AT&T took the position that on divestiture, it should inherit
all BOC competitive and unregulated businesses. See JointHearings Before Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Subcommittee on Monopolies of the House of

Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47 (1982) (testimony of Charles L. Brown,
Chairman, AT&T).
67. See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 7, at 7,176-81. "Bottleneck" or
"essential facilities" law is discussed infa, notes 212-38 and accompanying text.
68. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 7, at 7,175-76, 7,178-79. "Cross-subsidization" is a form of predatory pricing whereby a monopolist offers competitive
services below cost in order to drive out competitors, while continuing to make an
overall profit by "subsidizing" the competitive ventures with profits earned from mo-

nopoly ventures. See infa notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
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Both of these parties vigorously (and successfully) argued that
any competitive interexchange carrier needed the ability to
provide its own local exchange service in order to compete effectively.6 9 Thus, by recognizing that AT&T and other interexchange carriers could and did provide competitive local
exchange services, the court (together with the Department of
Justice and AT&T) implicitly repudiated the natural monopoly
theory underpinning adoption of the line-of-business
restrictions.
Of perhaps greater significance is the fact that, as implemented, the MFJ ultimately defined exchanges as comprising
geographic regions much larger than areas which conform to
the boundaries of traditional telephone exchanges. In accordance with the MFJ, AT&T prepared and filed a Plan of Reorganization (POR) for court approval which was reviewed in two
stages. The first stage, submitted on October 4, 1982, concerned
the establishment of exchange areas, otherwise referred to as
LATAs. 70 The purpose of the LATA boundaries was "to delineate the areas in which the various telecommunications companies will operate."7' On divestiture, the operating companies
were to be allowed to transport communications to and from
telephones and other apparatus located within the same LATA
(i.e., intra-LATA traffic). Facilities that crossed LATA boundaries were to be provided by AT&T and its long distance
competitors.
In approving the new MFJ exchange area boundaries, the
district court expressly recognized that "LATAs were established as a new territorial measure wholly unrelated to existing
exchanges or calling areas. ' '72 The court thus approved LATA
(or exchange area) boundaries which encompassed numerous
traditional local exchange areas; ultimately, 168 LATAs, 73 encompassing as many as one thousand traditional local exchanges, were established throughout the United States.7 4 The
69. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 175-76, 189 n.236; Competitive Impact Statement,
supra note 7, at 7,179. See also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990,

994 n.16 (D.D.C. 1983) (hereinafter LATA Decision).
70. The term is an acronym for Local Access and Transport Area. For MFJ purposes, the terms LATA and exchange area are synonymous.
71. LATA Decision, 569 F. Supp. at 995.
72. Id. at 1003.
73. Only 158 LATAs were immediately established, with the court postponing decision on the others. Id. at 990-91. See also id at 993-94 n.9.

74. See id at 1004.
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LATA boundaries established in the POR undercut even further the exchange/interexchange premise of the MFJ, because
the BOCs were thereby returned to the interexchange business
within the boundaries of the newly-established LATAs.75 The
MFJ's definition of exchange service was thus expanded to include traditional toll or interexchange service.
Modifications to the proposed decree insisted on by the district court and accepted by AT&T and the Department likewise
violated the philosophical and legal premises of the MFJ. Despite the assumption that a natural monopoly exchange service
provider should be excluded from competitive markets, the
court ruled that the BOCs must be permitted to remain in the
highly competitive terminal equipment and "Yellow Pages"
businesses and a procedure was established to permit them to
reenter any other prohibited competitive business based on the
section VIII(C) standard articulated above.76
Thus, the philosophically pure differentiation between monopoly and competitive services relied on by the Department
was shattered long before divestiture itself had even been accomplished. The BOCs had already been authorized to engage
in a wide variety of competitive business operations and it was
expressly recognized that even the so-called natural monopoly
exchange business was already competitive in significant respects. The terminal equipment market was already highly
competitive by the time the MFJ was approved, as was directory advertising.77 The new section VIII(C) assured open entry
by the BOCs into any market on a simple showing predicated
on long-standing antitrust principles.78 The court expressly
75. This had the effect of allowing the BOCs to provide relatively short-haul long
distance toll service, but precluded them from long-hall toll service. See generally
Response of the United States to Comments Received on the BOC LATA Proposals,
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C. 1983) (No. 82-0192);
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, 1108-10 (D.D.C. 1983) (hereinafter POR Decision).
76. The court required that the MFJ be modified to include a provision (section
VIII(C)) that the divested BOCs would be permitted to enter any business on a showing that there is "no substantial possibility that it could use its monopoly power to
impede competition in the market it seeks to enter." AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 225; see
also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 144-53 and accompanying text. See also OPP Divestiture Paper No. 11, supra note 43, at 29-32 for a general discussion on the competitiveness of
the terminal equipment market at the time the consent decree was approved.
78. The district court, in insisting on the addition of section VIII(C), recognized
that the line-of-business restrictions in the MFJ were not only "directly anticompetitive" but overbroad as well. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 186-88, 195. Thus, it was assumed
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found that AT&T's ability to compete in the ostensibly monopolized exchange marketplace was critical to its ability to respond to other interexchange competitors who were already
providing competitive exchange service .7 Finally, because the
exchange/interexchange market delineation on which the BOC
line-of-business prohibitions were predicated were not sustainable, the BOCs were allowed to return to the interexchange
business by the artifice of defining exchange telecommunications service to include traditional toll or interexchange
service.
. As scheduled, divestiture was effectuated on January 1, 1984.
On this date, AT&T divested its ownership interest in most of
the Bell System's exchange operations by contributing its stock
in the operating companies to seven holding companies.8 0 The
identity of the BOCs as duly incorporated entities was unaffected by divestiture.

IV
Regulatory Developments Contemporaneous with
Entry of the MFJ
The telecommunications marketplace has been characterized

by pervasive regulation at the federal and state level. The
existence of such regulation was unsuccessfully put forward by
AT&T as a defense to various antitrust lawsuits,8 ' including the
divestiture lawsuit.8 2 However, the district court and the Department of Justice went further than simply rejecting AT&T's
claims that regulators had not immunized AT&T's commercial
activities from antitrust scrutiny. The MFJ's line-of-business
restrictions are premised on the notion that the FCC and state
by the court that BOC entry into competitive business would be a relatively simple
matter. See id. at 194-95. In fact, the court of appeals recently found that the section
VIII(C) language is mandatory, and that the district court is required to grant a section VIII(C) petition on an appropriate showing. United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
797 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
79. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 175-76. See also LATA Decision, 569 F. Supp. at 994
n.16.
80. AT&T's controlling interests in Southern New England Telephone Company
and Cincinnati Bell were retained. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 212-13.
81. See, e.g., Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 487 F. Supp. 942,
946-47 (S.D.N.Y 1980); Jarvis, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 481 F. Supp. 120, 123-24
(D.D.C. 1978).
82. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1345 (D.D.C.
1981); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1320-30 (D.D.C.
1978).
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regulators are incapable of protecting the public's interest in a
competitive telecommunications marketplace from perceived
predation by exchange carriers .8 Thus, the MFJ essentially ignored critical contemporaneous regulatory developments
which undercut the factual premises underpinning the line-ofbusiness restrictions. In a series of decisions from 1980 to 1983,
the FCC analyzed the same markets and services addressed by
the MFJ, determined that a pro-competitive policy in these
markets and services would best serve the public interest,84 and
established a regulatory structure designed to prevent precisely
the competitive abuses alleged by the Department in support of
the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions.8 5
The FCC had actually begun to take pro-competitive action
long before 1980. The 1974 complaint's allegations in the various specialized common carrier and terminal equipment fields
were based on earlier FCC actions establishing competition in
these fields. 6 But 1980 represents the signal year in the development of a pro-competitive regulatory structure. That year, in
landmark decisions discussed below, the FCC:
1) determined that competition in all interexchange services
would serve the public interest, and began developing rules to
govern the manner in which interexchange service providers
87
would obtain access to exchange services;
2) determined that AT&T's participation in the unregulated
"enhanced services" market (which is broader than but includes the MFJ's information services market) would serve the
public interest, and therefore established detailed structural
rules to protect competition in this market;88 and
3) decided to completely deregulate all terminal equipment,
including equipment provided by AT&T, and imposed structural rules on AT&T to protect competition in the terminal
83. In the words of the district court, "If regulation could effectively prevent

these [anticompetitive] practices, there would have been no need for the AT&T action." AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 187, n.229.

84. The FCC is not bound by antitrust laws in formulating national telecommunications policy. See United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In fact,
the Commission may not adopt a policy based entirely on competitive concerns without also considering other public interest factors. See Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498
F.2d 771, 775-77 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
85. The primary examples of this new regulatory approach are access charges and
the Computer II rules. See infra notes 115-24, 133-43 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 90-105, 146-53 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
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equipment market.8 9

These decisions went almost unnoticed during the proceeding
leading up to the MFJ, with the result that the MFJ's line-ofbusiness restrictions are predicated on the entirely erroneous
assumption that regulators are either unwilling or incapable of
dealing with the modern telecommunications marketplace.
The next section addresses federal regulatory decisions in the
competitive areas of interexchange and information services
and terminal equipment.
A.

Exchange/Interexchange Services

The FCC's pro-competitive policies date back to 1956, the
same year the earlier AT&T consent decree was entered. But
it was not until the mid-1970s that the FCC focused on competition in what is known as the "public switched network"- universally available services generally offered under the names
Message Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone
Service (WATS). It was not until 1980 that the FCC finally decided that such competition should be permitted under the
Communications Act.
In 1956, the Commission commenced the Above 890 proceeding investigating whether or not its microwave frequency allocation policies were reasonable. 90 The proceeding included
consideration of whether the public interest was best served by
a policy which prohibited private users from constructing their
own facilities if there were common carrier services available
which could meet their needs.91 After extensive hearings, the
FCC ruled in 1959 that private users would be authorized to
construct and operate their own microwave systems whether or
not an existing common carrier was available to serve them.92
This decision was very limited and did not permit such private
89. See infra notes 144-164 and accompanying text.
90. See Allocation of Microwave Frequencies in the Above 890 Mc., Preliminary
Notice of Hearing in Docket No. 11,866 (released Nov. 9, 1956).
91. Traditional common carrier theory had held that such a system could not be
constructed if the service was available from an existing carrier. See, e.g., Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Television Broadcasters Ass'n, 17 F.C.C. 152, paras. 3-4 at 172-73
(1952). In a regulated monopoly environment, the regulator is charged with preventing wasteful duplication of facilities. See id, See also In the Matter of General Telephone Company of the Northwest, 17 F.C.C.2d 675, paras. 8-13 at 690 (1968); In the
Matter of Establishment of a Manufacturers Radio Service, 10 RAD. REG. (P&F) 157,
para. 3 at 159 (1954).
92. See In the Matter of Allocation of Microwave Frequencies in the Bands Above
890 Mc., Report and Order in Docket No. 11,866, 27 F.C.C. 359 (adopted July 29, 1959).
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users to make their facilities available to others, or even permit
a group of private users to share a single system.
Competition in the interexchange markets developed slowly
after 1959 as the FCC, often after prodding by appellate courts,
examined whether or not, and how, a competitive interstate
telecommunications market would serve the public interest.9"
The 1959 Above 890 decision94 allowed competition in only one
limited area of AT&T's market, namely point-to-point services
where a single entity had both the resources and the specialized
need to build its own facilities.95 In 1963, a small company
called Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) filed a request
to operate as a common carrier providing specialized voice,
data transmission, facsimile, and other private line services to
the public in competition with AT&T between St. Louis and
Chicago.96 Six years later, in August of 1969, the Commission
(by a 4-3 vote) granted MCI, under section 214 of the Communications Act, 97 the necessary operating authority.9" The three
dissenting Commissioners, while not opposing competition in
the provision of this interexchange service per se, questioned
whether or not the competition which MCI proposed in the
limited geographical area suggested would in fact serve the
public interest. 99 The issue of competition in what is known as
the public switched network, which forms the heart of the
MFJ's line-of-business restrictions, was not addressed at all. To
the contrary, MCI's proposed service offering was limited to
competition with what are known as the private line services of
93. It has generally been held that, in fulfilling its statutory mandate to protect
the public interest, the Commission may not simply rely on "competition for competition's sake" but rather must examine a broader array of factors. See, e.g., Hawaiian

Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d at 775-77; FCC v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86, 91-94
(1953).
94. Allocation of Microwave Frequencies in the Above 890 Mc., Preliminary Notice of Hearing in Docket No. 11,866 (released Nov. 9, 1956).
95. AT&T's own efforts to respond to this limited competition via private line

tariff modifications produced almost endless legal and regulatory proceedings. See,
e.g., In the Matter of AT&T, Initial Decision, 34 F.C.C. 244 (1961), Final Decision, 34

F.C.C. 217 (1963).
96. Private line services are utilized by users needing to communicate between
discrete locations; essentially, they provide the user with a dedicated line between
two points. MCI's proposed specialized services were private line in nature.
97. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1986).
98. In the Matter of Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d
953 (1969), reconsiderationdenied, 21 F.C.C.2d 190 (1970) [hereinafter MCI Decision].
99. MCI Decision, 18 F.C.C.2d at 971 (Hyde, Chairman, dissenting), 973 (Lee,
Comm'r, dissenting).
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AT&T-point-to-point services which do not feature the universal connectivity which marks the public switched network. 1°° The limited authorization granted to MCI to compete
in the more narrow point-to-point market, however, is generally perceived as the key to the dramatic regulatory developments which followed.
Following the authorization of MCI to enter the limited Chicago-St. Louis private line market, the Commission examined
the issue of specialized common carriers--carriers that provide
specialized point-to-point service to the public on a common
carrier basis-in a general rulemaking, and, in 1971, issued its
Specialized Common CarrierServices decision. 10 1 In that decision the Commission found:
[T]here is a public need and demand for the proposed facilities
and services and for new and diverse sources of supply, competition in the specialized communications field is reasonably feasible, there are grounds for a reasonable expectation that new
entry will have some beneficial effects, and there is no reason
to anticipate that new entry will have any adverse impact on
service to the public by existing carriers 10such
as to outweigh
2
the considerations supporting new entry.
The decision recognized that such specialized carriers would
often need local exchange facilities to originate and terminate
transmission (that is, to permit customers to access their private line services), and required that "established carriers with
exchange facilities should, upon request, permit interconnection or leased channel arrangements on reasonable terms and
conditions to be negotiated with the new carriers .... 1 o3 This
decision represented the first recognition of the possibility that
exchange access might be viewed as a distinct service, severable
from what had previously been viewed as an indispensible piece
of a unified end-to-end service. 104 While this decision assumed
100. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text. "Switching" is key to the universal availability of telephone service. Without switching, universal connectivity
could be provided only via dedicated lines among all points on the network. Private
line services, at least as evidenced in the MCI application, provided service to any
customer with a sufficient volume of business between two locations to justify such a
dedicated line.
101. Specialized Common Carrier Services, First Report and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870
(1971) affd sub. nom. Washington Utils. & Transp. Com'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th
Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975) [hereinafter Specialized Common Carrier].
102. Specialized Common Carrier,29 F.C.C.2d para. 103 at 870.
103. Id., para. 157 at 940.
104. See the Commission's later comment in In the Matter of MTS and WATS
Market Structure, Third Report and Order, 93 F.C.C.2d 241, para. 50 at 257 (1983):
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that these specialized common carriers would not provide services directly in competition with the interstate public switched
network (MTS and WATS), it did not specifically rule that such
specialized carriers would be prohibited from providing such
competitive services. Similarly, the interconnection requirement was not expressly limited to specialized common carriers,
and specifically excluded MTS or WATS competitors. °5
Shortly thereafter, focusing on carrier access to exchange
services and facilities, MCI raised the issue of the regulatory
status of competition with the AT&T public switched network.

After filing a tariff'06 in January 1975,107 MCI began marketing

a new service called "Execunet."' 0 AT&T complained to the
Commission that this service constituted an unlawful providing
of a competitive Message Telephone Service (MTS). The FCC
agreed and ruled that neither MCI's earlier authorization nor
the Specialized Common Carrierdecision permitted MCI to offer the switched service which comprised Execunet. Accordingly, the FCC ordered MCI to discontinue this service. MCI's
authorizations were, in the view of the Commission, solely limited to providing private line type services, and did not permit
MCI to enter the interexchange MTS market in competition
with AT&T. 109
The court of appeals reversed the Commission's decision on
essentially procedural grounds, finding that the Commission's
grant of operating authority to MCI had not specifically limited
MCI to private line service, and that no such implied limitation
"Neither the carriers nor the regulators viewed access service as a distinct service
before this Commission ordered the telephone companies to provide access service to
the new 'specialized' carriers."
105. The interconnection rights of "specialized" common carriers were upheld in
Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974).
106. Under section 203 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1986), interstate common carrier services may only be offered pursuant to tariffs being filed with
the FCC. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
107. Under the Communications Act, carriers do not need pre-approval of tariffs.
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 487 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1973). The FCC's power to
suspend a lawfully filed tariff is limited. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 203-05 (1982).
108. The Execunet service permitted a customer to dial an MCI office via local
exchange facilities and mechanically place a long distance call over MCI's facilities to
a distant exchange. The MCI "private lines" were thus not dedicated to the use of any
specific customer; rather, they were available to all MCI customers.
109. In the Matter of MCI Telecommunications Corp., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 25 (1976), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 61 F.C.C.2d 131 (1976),
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 63 F.C.C.2d 237 (1977).
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could be read into the Specialized Common Carrierdecision. 110
However, the court went further and examined the implied
finding by the FCC that AT&T was entitled to protection from
competition in the MTS market. The court expressed what it
described as its "concern" with
a thread running through the Commission's analysis-that the
Specialized Carrierdecision granted AT&T a dejure monopoly
over MTS and WATS service which would be undermined
were MCI allowed to provide Execunet-because any such assertion is plainly incorrect and may have11influenced the Commission's disposition of the instant case.
Immediately after the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in
the MCI proceeding on January 13, 1978, AT&T announced
that it would not provide local distribution (exchange) facilities
for MCI's Execunet service, contending that the local distribution requirements of the Specialized Common Carrierdecision
applied only to private line access to a local exchange." 2 The
FCC agreed and issued a declaratory ruling to that effect, stating, "We conclude that our prior Section 201(a) [interconnection] orders do not direct [AT&T] to provide interconnection of
facilities or services to any specialized common carrier to enable such a specialized common carrier to provide any service
which is substantially equivalent to MTS or WATS."1

3

MCI

immediately returned to the appellate court, claiming that the
Commission's ruling was inconsistent with the court's first Execunet decision, and that the decision violated the court's mandate. The appeals panel emphatically agreed with MCI and
granted its motion to enforce the mandate of the first Execunet
decision. 1 4 Thus, the ambiguity in the Specialized Common
Carrier decision was interpreted against the FCC and MCI's
competitive MTS service was granted interconnection rights to
exchange carriers' local distribution facilities.
In the meantime, in a decision adopted on the same day as
the declaratory ruling denying MCI access rights for its new
competitive MTS service, the FCC initiated a rulemaking to determine, essentially for the first time, "whether the public interest requires that interstate message toll telephone service
110. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978) [hereinafter Execunet].
111. Execunet, 561 F.2d at 379.
112. See In the Matter of American Tel. & Tel. Co., 67 F.C.C.2d 1455 (1978).
113. Id. para. 79 at 1479.
114. MCI Telecommunications -Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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(MTS) and/or wide area toll telephone service (WATS), or
their functional equivalents, should be provided on a sole
source basis (i.e., free from direct competition)."" 5 In its Notice
of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, the Commission sought
to review the fundamental premise on which the MFJ's interexchange prohibition is based, and to determine whether or not
interexchange MTS and WATS-type services should be
116
competitive.

Two years later, in 1980, the Commission finally decided that
competition in the MTS and WATS markets would be publicly
beneficial, and embarked on a course of open entry in these areas." 7 The FCC concluded, in its Report and Third Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, that
"competition in all interstate interexchange services is in the
public interest and will further the goals of the Communications Act of 1934. ' ' 118

The Commission acknowledged the difficulty created by the
piecemeal approach it had taken in dealing with this critical issue in the past:
If this Commission had anticipated that the new entrants
would be providing services that challenge MTS and WATS
competitively to a substantial degree, we undoubtedly would
have resolved questions with respect to the effect of such competition upon facilities development, local distribution revenues of independent telephone companies, and averaging of
MTS rates in Specialized Common CarrierServices. This proceeding was designed in part to give the opponents of competition in interstate services another opportunity to present
arguments which were not considered in 1971.1"
Thus, in late 1980, the Commission finally ruled definitively
that competition and open entry in the public switched interexchange markets was in the public interest and would be
encouraged.
115. In re MTS and WATS Market Structure, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule
Making, 67 F.C.C.2d 757 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
116. Id. paras. 3-5 at 758, paras. 10-11 at 760.
117. Open entry refers to the policy of permitting carriers to establish new lines of
communication without a prior showing that construction of the new line would serve
the public interest. See Washington Utils. and Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142,
1155-59 (9th Cir. 1975).
118. In the Matter of MTS and WATS Market Structure, Report and Third Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, 81 F.C.C.2d 177, para. 24 at 183
(1980).
119. Id. para. 17 at 181.
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Once the decision was made that interexchange competition
was consistent with the public interest, the Commission then
needed to address the very difficult issue of how competitive
interexchange carriers would access local exchange networks
to originate and terminate telephone calls. Beginning in 1979,
carriers other than AT&T were provided exchange access pursuant to a contract which set access rates between what AT&T
itself paid for MTS and WATS access and what it charged for
other services. 120 Recognizing that the access pricing scheme
which developed during the pre-competition era could not
function in a competitive interexchange market, the Commission proceeded to develop rules governing the charges to be
1 21
paid by all interexchange carriers for interstate access.
These rules, which resulted in access tariffs which took effect
in June 1984, established essential equality in exchange access
among interexchange carriers. Recognizing that AT&T's access to exchange facilities was temporarily technologically superior to access available to other carriers, a transition plan
granted non-AT&T carriers a substantial rate discount while
"equal access" was implemented. 122 Access tariffs developed
pursuant to these rules went into effect in June of 1984 for socalled "switched access," generally used by MTS and WATS
competitors, 123 and a year later for "special access," generally
utilized by private line competitors.' 24
120. This agreement, called the Exchange Network Facilities for Interstate Access
(ENFIA) remained in effect while the Commission examined the entire access issue.
See Exchange Network Facilities for Interstate Access v. FCC, Memorandum Opinion
and Order in Docket No. 78-371, FCC 86-504 (released Nov. 14, 1986) (the Commission
refused to grant certain interexchange carriers "refunds" based on alleged
overcharges in the ENFIA rates); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 712 F.2d
517 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
121. See In the Matter of MTS and WATS Market Structure (Phase I), 93 F.C.C.2d
241 [hereinafter Third Report and Order], modified on reconsideration,97 F.C.C.2d
682 (1983) [hereinafter First ReconsiderationOrder], modified on further reconsideration, 97 F.C.C.2d 834 (1984) [hereinafter Second Reconsideration Order], afffd and
remanded in part sub nom., National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737
F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985).
122. Third Report and Order, 93 F.C.C.2d paras. 151-68 at 286-90; FirstReconsideration Order, 97 F.C.C.2d paras. 91-127 at 723-35; Second Reconsideration Order, 97
F.C.C.2d paras. 51-92 at 852-63.
123. Second ReconsiderationOrder, 97 F.C.C.2d Appendix A, at 883-84.
124. In the Matter of Investigation of Access/Divestiture Related Tariffs, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 102 F.C.C.2d 1007, paras. 65-66 at 1036-37, paras. 72-79 at
1039-40 (1985).
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Information Services

At the time the FCC was determining the status of interexchange competition under the Communications Act, it was
simultaneously addressing a market which was already competitive, and which was in large part identical to the one which
provided the ostensible basis for the MFJ's information services prohibition-namely the enhanced services market. The
Commission ultimately decided that the unified, pre-divestiture
AT&T should for the first time be permitted to enter, subject
to important regulatory rules, this new market on the basis of
public interest considerations shortly before the MFJ decreed
that the BOCs should be excluded from this same market.
In the early 1970s, recognizing that data processing and communications technologies were merging, the FCC issued what
has become known as its First ComputerInquiry (ComputerI)
decision. 125 In this decision, the Commission attempted to distinguish between data processing functions and services, which
were not regulated, and communications functions and services, which were regulated. The Commission recognized that
computers provided both data processing functions and communications switching functions, and that "remote access data
processing" could combine both functions in a single
126
computer.
In its Computer I decision, the Commission defined data
processing as the use of a computer for "the processing of information,1 2 7 as opposed to "switching".1 28 Under the Computer
I rules, carriers could provide both data processing and commu125. See generally In the Matter of Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by
the Interdependence of Computers and Communication Services and Facilities (Com-

puter Inquiry), 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) [hereinafter Computer , Tentative Decision], 28
F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) [hereinafter Computer I, FinalDecision and Order], affid in part
sub nom.GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir.), dec'n on remand, 40
F.C.C.2d 293, paras. 4-5 (1973).

126. See Computer I, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d para. 15 at 295-96, paras. 3942 at 304-05. Former section 64.702 (a)(4) of the Commission's rules (Computer 1)

defined "Remote Access Data Processing Service" as "an offering of data processing
wherein communications facilities, linking a central computer to remote customer
terminals, provide a vehicle for the transmission of data between such computer and
customer terminals." See Computer I, FinalDecision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d para. 4
at 287.
127. Computer I, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d para 15 at 295-96.

128. "Switching" is the term utilized to denote creation of transmission paths
among multiple users. A common definition of switching is "interconnecting circuits
in order to establish a temporary connection between two or more stations." G. LANGLEY, TELEPHONY'S DICTIONARY, (2 ed. 1986), s.v. "switching." See also supra note 100.
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nications services, but only through a separate subsidiary. 129
So-called "hybrid" services involving both data processing and
telecommunications could be offered directly by carriers if the
services were primarily telecommunications in nature, but
could not be offered if they were primarily data processing in
nature. 3 ° Since it was assumed that AT&T could not provide
data processing services due to the line-of-business restrictions
in the 1956 consent decree, AT&T was not covered by the separate subsidiary rule.13 '
However, due to the advent of distributed computer processing 1 2 and smart terminals (remote terminals with their own
built-in intelligence), the Computer I definitional approach to
the market was, as a rule, obsolete almost before it had been
entered a rule because remote access data processing, on which
Computer I relied, no longer represented the actual use computers made of telephone networks. Therefore, in 1976 the
Commission initiated what has become known as the Second
Computer Inquiry (Computer II) to establish a regulatory
structure which would recognize the realities of advancing
technology. 33
In its landmark Computer I decision, 3 the Commission es129. See Computer I, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d paras. 34-38 at 302-04. The
separate subsidiary rules did not apply to smaller carriers.
130. Id. paras. 39-46 at 304-06.
131. The Commission stated that "such companies [Bell System] shall not offer
data processing which is not clearly incidental to communications within the meaning
[of paragraph V(g)] of the Consent Judgment and this policy statement." See id. para.
43 at 305.
132. Distributed computer processing refers to processing which utilizes logically
interconnected processing modes which share common resources. In the technological environment which led to the Computer I rules, all processing was done at a central computer, which was accessed remotely by terminals which did not have standalone processing capabilities. In the Matter of Amendment of Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Tentative Decision,
72 F.C.C.2d 358, paras. 10-11 (1979) [hereinafter Computer II, Tentative Decision].
133. In the Matter of Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, 61 F.C.C.2d 103, para. 12 (1976) [hereinafter Computer II, Notice of Inquiry]; Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Enlargement of Proposed Rule Making, 64 F.C.C.2d
771, paras. 2-4 (1977) [hereinafter Computer II, Supplemental Notice];ComputerII,
Tentative Decision, 72 F.C.C.2d, paras 10-17, at 363-66.
134. In the Matter of Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, paras. 2-13
(1980) [hereinafter Computer II, Final Decision], modified, 84 F.C.C.2d 50, para. 2
(1980) [hereinafter Computer II, Reconsideration Order], further modified, 88
F.C.C.2d 12, para. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Computer II, FurtherReconsiderationOrder],
affd sub nom. Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198
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tablished a whole new system of classification of services. Basic
services, provided by common carriers, were defined primarily
as the provision of a "pure transmission capability. 1 3 5 Carrier

services defined as basic included transmission of information
and the switching necessary to route the transmission. By this
time switching services were provided in many instances by
electronic switches, which are simply highly sophisticated computers. Basic services were regulated under Title II of the
Communications Act."3 6 A second category of services, called
enhanced services, were classified under Computer II as noncommon carrier services, not subject to regulation. These enhanced services were defined as
services, offered over common carrier transmission facilities
used in interstate communications, which employ computer
processing applications that act on the format, content, code,
protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured information;
or involve subscriber interaction with
13 7
stored information.

AT&T was permitted to provide enhanced services through a
fully separate subsidiary which was required to deal with
AT&T itself on an arm's length basis.' Unlike the Computer I
decision, the FCC decided that enhanced services could be provided by AT&T's fully separate subsidiary despite the fact that
enhanced services were, by definition, not "common carrier
communications services" as provided in the 1956 consent decree.' 3 9 The Computer H decision was modified on reconsideration in 1980 and 1981, and affirmed by the court of appeals in
(D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983), further modified, FCC 84-190, 56
RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 301 (released May 4, 1984).
135. Computer II, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d para. 96 at 420.
136. Id. para. 92 at 419.
137. Id. Appendix para. 1(a) at 498. See also 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1985). Enhanced
services would include data processing, voice storage and retrieval ("electronic mail
box"), "dial-it" information services (sports scores, etc.), and a wide variety of computer applications which rely on the telecommunications network. The most controversial aspect of the enhanced services definition involves the processing of "codes"
and "protocols" during transmission because such processing is inherent in modern
data communications. See In the Matter of Petitions for Waiver of Section 64.702 of
the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 1057, para. 2 (1985) [hereinafter Computer II,
Waiver of Section 64.702].
138. See generally Computer II, FinalDecision, 77 F.C.C.2d paras. 233-64 at 466-88.
139. See generally id. paras. 271-81 at 490-95.
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late 1982.140 Detailed rules and policies governing the interaction between AT&T and its subsidiary were developed over the
next several years.141
There is a close relationship between enhanced services
under Computer II and information services under the MFJ.
Information services are defined in the MFJ:
Information service means the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information which may be
conveyed via telecommunications, except that such service
does not include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or
the management of a telecommunications service. 142

While there are a variety of services defined as "enhanced"
under Computer II which are not within the information Services restriction of the MFJ, 43 most information services are
also enhanced services. Thus, as is the case with interexchange
telecommunications services, the FCC had enacted new procompetitive regulatory policies and procedures applicable to
the provision of information services by AT&T slightly more
than a year prior to the announcement of the consent decree.
The hypothesis that the FCC was incapable of devising a coherent regulatory structure in this area was thus completely
untested.
140. See supra note 134.
141. See generally Procedures for Implementing the Detariffing of Customer

Premises Equipment and Enhanced Services (Second Computer Inquiry), Second Report and Order;FCC 84-269 (released June 29, 1984), [hereinafter Mobile Services Order]; Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 1276 (1983) [hereinafter Computer II, AT&T
Order].
142. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 229.
143. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Third Computer Inquiry); and Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive
Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Thereof; Communications
Protocols under Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Docket No. 85-229, Phase II, FCC 86-253,
paras. 15-40 (released June 16, 1986), summarized in Common Carrier Service: Replacing Structural Separation with Nonstructural Safeguards for the Provision of Enhanced Services, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 1 FED. REG. 2D
24,410 (July 3, 1986) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. 64) [hereinafter ComputerII, Supplemental Notice]. See also North American Telecommunications Assoc. (Integration of
Centrex, Enhanced Services, and CPE), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 58 RAD.
REG. 2d (P & F) 402 (released May 29, 1985); Applied Spectrum Technologies, Inc.
Petition for Declaratory Ruling Under Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules Regarding the Status of "Spread Spectrum" Transmission Services (ENF No. 85-86),
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Mimeo No. 5532 (released July 3, 1985).
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Terminal Equipment

A third competitive market addressed by the MFJ involved
terminal equipment (CPE). 4 4 In fact, CPE competition had existed for some time prior to the MFJ. Indeed, much of the Department of Justice's evidence against AT&T dealt with CPE.
The Department's demand that the BOCs be completely excluded from the CPE market was rejected by the district court
in accepting the MFJ. Nevertheless, FCC policy in this area is
relevant because the Department again overlooked key regulatory developments in seeking to exclude the divested BOCs
from this market. In addition, although the BOCs can compete
in the CPE provisioning market, they are still precluded by the
MFJ from manufacturing terminal equipment. 45
The primary emphasis and controversy in the FCC's competitive actions concerning terminal equipment involved standards
for interconnection to local exchange networks. For many decades only Bell System-supplied equipment could be attached
to the telephone network. Obviously, a telephone is useless unless it can be connected to a telephone network and equipment
vendors' efforts to obtain such interconnection rights combined
with AT&T's resistance to such efforts marked regulatory litigation for several decades.
The first major decision in this area was issued in 1956 by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit when it
decided Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States.'4 6 In that decision, the court reversed an FCC order which had sustained a
provision in AT&T's tariffs precluding a customer from attaching any non-AT&T approved device to a telephone. The HushA-Phone was a small device which could be attached to a telephone instrument and enabled the speaker to avoid being overheard by others in the vicinity. The device did not interact
electronically with the telephone or the telephone network,
and thus had no potential to harm the telephone network.
Nevertheless, AT&T had informed distributors and users that
attachment of the Hush-A-Phone device to a telephone was un144. Terminal equipment is often denominated "customer premises equipment" or

"CPE." The FCC defines CPE primarily based on where the equipment is locatedi.e., whether it is on the customer's premise. See Computer II, AT&T Order, 95

F.C.C.2d para. 1 n.2 at 1276. The MFJ similarly defines CPE based on the location of
the equipment. Cf §§ IV(E) and IV(N), AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 228-29.
145. See MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 231.

146. 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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lawful because it violated AT&T's tariffs. 47 The court of appeals, in language which established an important principle
which would govern the introduction of competition in all aspects of telecommunications, held that the Commission's decision (and the tariff in question) constituted an "unwarranted
interference with the telephone subscriber's right reasonably
to use his telephone in ways which are privately beneficial
without being publicly detrimental."' 4 a
The next major case concerning terminal equipment involved a device called a Carterfone, which was utilized to connect mobile radio telephone systems to AT&T's network.
Unlike the earlier Hush-A-Phone, the Carterfone interacted
with the public network and AT&T asserted that the tariff provision prohibiting attachment of the Carterfone was justified
because interconnection of the Carterfone to the network could
cause network harm. 149 Acting on referral from a district court
in an antitrust suit brought by the manufacturer against
AT&T, 150 the FCC found that the tariff was illegal and had
been "unreasonable and unreasonably discriminatory since its
inception.'

151

The Commission ordered AT&T to file new tar-

iffs to allow interconnection of all devices with the network
which did not cause actual harm.5 2 The FCC ruled that carriers could lawfully file tariffs which denied interconnection
rights to devices which did in fact cause harm to their networks, but where such restrictive tariffs were filed, the burden
of demonstrating harm was placed on the filing carriers. 153
The interconnection rights granted in Carterfone produced
only moderate success. It was generally claimed, both in anti147. Id. at 267. Duly filed tariffs are generally held to have the force and effect of
law. See, e.g., United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 57 F. Supp. 451, 455-56

(S.D.N.Y. 1944).
148. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
149. Essentially, AT&T claimed that installation of unauthorized equipment in the
unified fabric of the national telephone network could disrupt the smooth functioning
of the network itself. See supra note 146.
150. See Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 250 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Tex. (1966)),
affd, 365 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 1008 (1967).
151. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Telephone Service, Decision, 13

F.C.C.2d 420, 425 [hereinafter Carterfone, Decision] reconsideration denied, 14
F.C.C.2d 571, 572-74 (1968) [hereinafter Carterfone, Memorandum Opinion and
Order].
152. Carterfone,Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d at 424-26; Carterfone, Memorandum Opin-

ion and Order, 14 F.C.C.2d paras. 3-7 at 572-74.
153. Carterfone,Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d at 424-26; Carterfone,Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.2d paras. 3-7 at 572-74.
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trust suits and at the Commission, that AT&T's network harm
tariff restrictions were unduly limiting and anticompetitive
and, most importantly, imposed interconnection restrictions
entirely unrelated to protection of the network.M The Commission thus commenced its own inquiry, following which it
established the "Part 68 Registration Program.' 1

55

Through

the Part 68 procedures, the Commission undertook to oversee
the registration of terminal equipment and standards for protecting the network from harm caused by connection of terminating equipment. All terminal equipment which met the
standards set forth in the new Part 68 of the Commission's
rules could primafacie lawfully be connected to the telephone
network on proper registration with the FCC.'5 The program
went into effect in October of 1977 after affirmance by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and denial of Supreme Court
review. 57
During this entire period, terminal equipment supplied by
AT&T was connected to the network under both AT&T's and
the local exchange carriers' tariffs. Thus, AT&T's terminal
equipment was supplied to customers as a regulated service in a
manner quite different from that in which competitive vendors
offered identical equipment. Not surprisingly, even after the
right of competitive vendors and end users to connect nonAT&T equipment to the network was firmly established, complaints still arose that AT&T was utilizing its combined position as carrier-supplier and equipment vendor in a manner
which was anticompetitive. 5 ' To finally resolve the competitive
problems which necessarily occur whenever a tariffed service
competes with unregulated vendors, the Commission, in 1980,
decided to totally sever terminal equipment from the telephone
network. 159 Thus, in its Computer II decision, the Commission
ruled that terminal equipment no longer constituted part of
the provision of common carrier service regulatable under Ti154. See Proposal for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message
Toll Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), First Report and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 593, para. 16 at 598 (1975).
155. See generally id. paras. 17-56 at 599-613.
156. Id. para. 16 at 598-99, para. 53 at 612.
157. North Carolina Utilities Comm. v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
158. See Northeastern Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981).
159. See generally Computer II, FinalDecision, 77 F.C.C.2d paras. 133-89 at 435-57.
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tle II of the Communications Act. 1 0 Instead, the Commission
chose to exercise its ancillary authority161 over terminal equipment and directed that CPE be completely unbundled 162 by all
carriers from carrier network services. AT&T itself was further restricted in that it could provide terminal equipment only
through the fully separate subsidiary which it utilized to offer
enhanced services. 63
The FCC's pro-competitive actions in the three areas of exchange/interexchange, information services, and terminal
equipment competition 1 4 radically altered the marketplace
which had existed in 1974 when the antitrust suit was initiated,

and effectively rendered moot the competitive and regulatory
premises on which the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions are
predicated. The FCC essentially permitted competitive interexchange services and commenced the process of developing a
regulatory structure which would promote interexchange competition immediately prior to the announcement of the consent
160. Id. paras. 140-61 at 438-47.
161. The Commission is empowered under section 4(i) of the Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. § 154(i), to "perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and
issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions." See North American Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC, 772
F.2d 1282, 1292-93 (7th Cir. 1985).
162. Unbundled service can be viewed generally as a customer's ability to purchase
desired products or services without being required to purchase other goods or services "bundled" with them. Because of the complex pricing policies which governed the
telecommunications market (and in many cases continue to do so), unbundling of
products and services in the 1970s was a very complex task. See Computer II, Further
ReconsiderationOrder, 88 F.C.C.2d paras. 37-45 at 524-28.
163. See Computer II, FinalDecision, 77 F.C.C.2d paras. 201-66 at 461-88.
164. In addition to the three areas discussed above, the FCC took numerous other
pro-competitive actions in this time frame. See generally Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations
Therefore, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979); First
Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980) [hereinafter FirstReport], Further Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (1981) [hereinafter FurtherNotice], Second
Report and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982) [hereinafter Second Report], Order on Reconsideration, 93 F.C.C.2d 54 (1983) [hereinafter ReconsiderationOrder], Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, FCC No. 82-187, 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1516
(released August 7, 1984) [hereinafter Second FurtherNotice], Third Further Notice
of Proposed Rule Making, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,292 (June 21, 1983) [hereinafter Third Further Notice], Third Report and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791 (October 15, 1983) [hereinafter Third Report], Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554 (1983) [hereinafter
Fourth Report], Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,856
(March 28, 1984) [hereinafter Fourth Further Notice], Fifth Report and Order, 98
F.C.C.2d 1191 (1984) [hereinafter Fifth Report ], Sixth Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d
1020 (1985) [hereinafter Sixth Report], rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub
nom. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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decree. These decisions thereby rendered inaccurate the district court's assessment that the FCC's regulatory structure for
competitive exchange access was inadequate to prevent the filing of the 1974 complaint. The competitive MTS market did
not even exist in 1974. The court's conclusions regarding the
information services market were likewise unsubstantiated, because the pre-divestiture AT&T was not even permitted entry
into much of what now comprises the information services
market until the FCC's 1980 Computer II decision. In short,
the marketplace addressed by the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions did not exist in 1982 when the consent decree was entered. Nor had it existed in 1974 when the lawsuit was
initiated. As noted in the following sections, the hypothetical
premises on which the line-of-business restrictions are predicated are even less valid today.

V
MFJ Line-of-Business Restrictions and Current
Federal Regulatory Policy
Existing FCC statutory jurisdiction permits the FCC to address directly the antitrust concerns which ostensibly form the
basis for the line-of-business restrictions," 5 and FCC rules and
policies are now in place to effectuate the FCC's pro-competitive policies in essentially the same communications markets
and services as are now denied to the BOCs under the MFJ.
The MFJ contains three prohibitory injunctive provisions and
an affirmative injunctive requirement pertinent to the telecommunications/information services industry.166 These provisions
are:
1) The BOCs may not provide interexchange (that is, interLATA) telecommunications services;
165. In fact, the FCC has been delegated a substantial amount of concurrent antitrust jurisdiction. For instance, section 313(a) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 313(a) (1986), requires the Commission to take account of the antitrust laws as part
of its regulatory duties. In addition, the Commission may directly enforce certain
sections of the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 21(a) & (b) (1985). Moreover, a substantial body of case law has established that the competitive considerations are subsumed
under the Commission's charge to regulate under the public interest standard. See
United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 104-06 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The FCC may also immunize consolidations of telephone companies or proposed acquisitions from jeopardy
under the antitrust laws where the public interest warrants. 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1986).
166. As noted previously, the MFJ also prohibits the BOCs from entering any.
other competitive business. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 224; MFJ,552 F. Supp. at 227-28.
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2) The BOCs may not provide information services;
3) The BOCs may not manufacture telecommunications
equipment;

4) The BOCs must provide all interexchange carriers with exchange access equal to that provided to AT&T." 7
These restrictions were imposed to alleviate three perceived
dangers to competition: (1) denial of exchange access to competitors; (2) discriminatory provision of access; and (3) cross168
subsidization of competitive services by monopoly services.
The subject matter of these MFJ provisions is, for the most
part, squarely within the jurisdiction of appropriate regulatory
authorities, and the FCC has exercised this jurisdiction to prevent the competitive dangers postulated in defense of the restrictions. The key MFJ line-of-business restrictions needlessly
duplicate regulatory authority vested by statute in the FCC.
A.

FCC Jurisdiction Over Line-of-Business Restrictions

The line-of-business restriction which is often considered to
be absolutely crucial to the MFJ-the prohibition against BOC
provision of interexchange telecommunications services 169 falls directly within the FCC's regulatory authority over interstate services.170 This authority provides that the FCC may regulate the price at which interstate services may be offered by
the BOCs, including prices, terms, and conditions for interstate
access.

171

What is more, the FCC also has the authority to enforce the
specific interexchange service prohibition contained in the
MFJ should it be determined on an adequate record that such a
prohibition is necessary or appropriate to fulfill the Commission's statutory mandate. Section 214 of the Communications
Act requires prior FCC approval for the construction of any in167. Equal access is set forth in section II(A) and Appendix B to the MFJ. MFJ,

552 F. Supp. at 232-34.
168. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 186-97.
169. The district court notes the importance of this prohibition: "To permit the

Operating Companies to compete in this market would be to undermine the very purpose of the proposed decree-to create a truly competitive environment in the telecommunications industry." Id. at 188.
170. Similar authority resides in the state governments for intrastate services.
171. Section 201 of the Communications Act vests the FCC with authority to require carriers "to establish physical connections with other carriers, to establish
through routes and charges applicable thereto and the divisions of such charges, and
to establish and provide facilities and regulations for operating such through routes."
47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1986).
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terstate line of communication. 1 72 The Commission has the

power to deny issuance of a section 214 certificate or to attach
"such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity may require.'

173

Thus, even if the inter-

exchange prohibition were to be removed entirely from the
MFJ, the BOCs could not reenter the interexchange business
on an interstate level without first securing the prior approval
of the FCC. 74
The MFJ's information services prohibition similarly duplicates federal regulation. The FCC, in its Computer II rules, 175
enacted detailed rules for regulating the interplay between
what are called enhanced and basic telecommunications services. 76 As noted above, 77 practically all communications services which are defined as information services under the MFJ
are within the class of services which the FCC defines as enhanced for Computer II purposes. Enhanced services are defined as non-common carrier services and are thereby exempt
from regulation under Title II of the Communications Act. 7 1
The Computer II rules in essence require that enhanced services offered by a carrier utilize the carrier's basic transmission
facilities and services on a resale basis-that is, carrier-supplied
enhanced services must utilize basic transmission and switching services in the same manner as if actually purchased under
the carrier's tariff. 7 9 For AT&T and the divested BOCs, enhanced services could only be offered by a fully separate
subsidiary 80
172. See 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1986).
173. 47 U.S.C. § 214(c) (1986).

174. Most state regulators have similar authority over intrastate interexchange toll
service and several states have taken action to deregulate intrastate toll service. See
NTIA, PUB. No. 85-16, ISSUES IN DOMESTIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS: DIRECTIONS FOR
NATIONAL POLICY 100-33 (1985) (review and survey of state deregulatory actions
which is contained in the published report of the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration). See also Inter-LATA Competition Near Universal:
Many States Address AT&TRegulation, THE REPORT ON AT&T, No. 40 (Oct. 13, 1986)
at 1, 4-8; Long Distance Telephone Competition: Before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Communications, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 84-118 (1985) (statement of Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, FCC).
175. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 (1985).
176. Supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text (discussing the Computer H1 definitional framework).
177. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
178. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1985).
179. See Computer II, FinalDecision, 77 F.C.C.2d paras. 190-226 at 457-88; ReconsiderationOrder, 84 F.C.C.2d paras. 73-89 at 75-79.
180. Computer II, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d paras. 228-33 at 473-75. The BOCs
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Although enhanced services are not common carrier services,
the Commission's Computer II structure, enacted under the
Commission's so-called ancillary authority,18 ' has been viewed
as a comprehensive regulatory scheme-so much so that state
regulatory authority over enhanced services was preempted by
the FCC 82 and AT&T was permitted to market enhanced services despite an apparent conflict with the 1956 consent decree. 8 3 While the Commission's authority to absolutely
preclude a carrier or its affiliates from providing enhanced
services is dubious (and thus it is not clear that the information
services prohibition of the MFJ could be entirely duplicated by
the FCC),8 the Commission's authority to take all necessary
and appropriate action to ensure that carrier services are not
improperly intermingled with or subsidized by information
services as defined in the MFJ is well settled.8 5 However, unlike the information services prohibition in the MFJ, the FCC
has made an express policy judgment that carrier provision of
enhanced services, which includes most information services, is
in the public interest, and has established and continues to develop detailed rules to govern such provision.8 6
The final specific MFJ restriction relating to telecommunications precludes the BOCs from manufacturing terminal equipwere still part of the Bell System when the Computer I rules were developed and
implemented. The separate subsidiary rules were ultimately applied to the BOCs in a
separate proceeding. See Furnishing of Customer Premises Equipment, Enhanced
Services and Cellular Communications Services by the Bell Operating Companies,
Report and Order in Docket No. 83-115, 95 F.C.C.2d 1117 (1983), affd sub nom. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1984), modified on reconsideration sub nom., Bell Operating Companies Structural Separations, Reconsideration
Order, 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 581 (1984), affd sub nom. North American Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1985).
181. See Computer II, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d para. 132 at 435; Computer and
Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 206-14 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See also
supra note 161 and accompanying text.
182. See Computer II, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d paras. 171-89 at 450-57; Computer and Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 214-18 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
183. See Computer II, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d paras. 271-91 at 490-95; Computer and Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 219-20 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
184. But see General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. United States, 449 F.2d 846,
853, 864 (5th Cir. 1971) (the Fifth Circuit Court sustained the Commission prohibition
of telephone company provision of CATV services).
185. See Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 465, 473 (7th Cir. 1984).
186. For a further discussion of this authority in the context of "open network
architecture" and "cross-subsidization" issues, see infra notes 206-52 and accompanying text.
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ment and other telecommunications-related equipment.187 In
this regard, the Commission has no direct authority over carrier manufacturing, and probably could not lawfully enact a
manufacturing prohibition such as that which exists in the
MFJ. Nevertheless, the Commission clearly has statutory authority to examine contracts between carriers and affiliated
manufacturers or other suppliers,8 8 and, through utilization of
its authority over interstate rates, may preclude a carrier which
purchases equipment from a manufacturing affiliate from passing exorbitant charges for the purchase of such manufactured
products on to the ratepayers through regulated rates.189 Thus,
while the Commission cannot replicate the MFJ's manufacturing prohibition, it does have ample power to prevent a carrier/
manufacturer from utilizing its position as a carrier to compete
unfairly in the manufacturing marketplace.
B.

Equal Access

The so-called equal access provisions of the MFJ are also duplicative of FCC regulatory authority and FCC rules adopted
pursuant to that authority. The MFJ requires that the BOCs
provide equal access to all interexchange carriers and information services providers. In the words of the MFJ:
[E]ach BOC shall provide to all interexchange carriers and information service providers exchange access, information access, and exchange services for such access on an unbundled,
tariffed basis, that is equal in type, quality, and price to that
provided to AT&T and its affiliates. 9 °
The details of this equal access requirement are spelled out in
Appendix B to the MFJ. As required, all BOCs have filed
equal access conversion schedules with the Department of Justice. The FCC's authority to require equal access is sufficiently
broad to encompass these precise requirements and the FCC
has enacted detailed equal access regulations which often duplicate, and often contradict, the MFJ.
187. See MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 227.
188. See 47 U.S.C. § 215(c) (1986).
189. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 152, 205 (1986). In this regard, see License Contract Agreements, Notice of Inquiry, 84 F.C.C.2d 259 (1981).
190. MFJ,552 F. Supp. at 227. The key elements of this requirement are equality,
tariffing of access, and unbundling of the service elements which make up such access. The MFJ court recently expanded the equal access requirements to cover all
customers. See Memorandum, United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192 (D.D.C.
filed Nov. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Nov. 26, 1986 Memorandum).
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The FCC's authority in this area derives from section 201 of
the Communications Act, which gives the Commission express
statutory authority to require carriers "to establish physical
connections with other carriers.... ."I" The FCC has utilized

this authority in its oversight and enforcement of its access
tariff rules to enact rules requiring that interstate carriers receive essentially equal access to an exchange carrier's facilities. 92 The FCC's rules, while often tracking the MFJ's equal
access requirements, go further than does the MFJ in spelling
out the details of the services which exchange carriers must
make available to the interexchange carriers 193 and the prices
at which these services must be offered.'94 As exchange access
for interstate carriers is determined to be an interstate service
itself and the facilities over which such access is offered are interstate facilities, the authority of the FCC in this area is secure.195 The ComputerII rules likewise provide a type of equal
access structure for enhanced services vendors and the open
network architecture outlined in the Third Computer Inquiry
(Computer III)19 6 is premised on an equal access concept for

such vendors. Thus, in the area of the basic equal access requirements of the MFJ, the authority of the federal regulator
completely duplicates the MFJ's provisions.
This duplication is merely a nuisance so long as the regulatory policies of the Department of Justice, the district court,
and the FCC are identical. However, the common goals of the
Department, the court, and the Commission, to the extent they
ever existed, are quickly unraveling.
For example, the district court recently ruled that the equal
access requirements of the MFJ require that the BOCs give to
191. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1986).
192. See generally 47 C.F.R. §§ 61, 69 (1985).
193. See, e.g., Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related Tariffs, Memorandum Opinion and Order in Docket No. 83-1145, Phase I, FCC 85-293, 58 RAD. REG. 2d
(P&F) (released June 12, 1985).
194. See WATS-Related and Other Amendments of Part 69 of the *Commission's
Rules, Second Report and Order in Docket No. 86-1, FCC 86-377 (released Aug. 26,
1986).
195. See generally National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Cornm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095,
1103, 1110-19 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985). For intrastate exchange access for carriers, state rules generally likewise provide for such equality,
although some states do not permit intrastate competition. See, e.g., THE GEODESIC
NETwoRK, 1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY 3.15-.17 (Jan.

1987) [hereinafter 1987 GEODESIC NETWORK REPORT].
196. The Third Computer Inquiry (Computer III) is the recent FCC proceeding
seeking to modify some aspects of the Computer II rules and policies.
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interexchange carriers such as AT&T the same access that is
available to other customers.'97 If this decision is affirmed on
appeal, the MFJ's equal access rules ultimately could displace
practically all federal and state cost allocation rules which determine how access and other exchange services are priced.
A requirement that all exchange services be priced the same
is not necessarily a bad result-although it would appear to be
well beyond the district court's legitimate jurisdiction. There is
general industry agreement that the pricing anomalies which
are a part of current regulated telecommunications services
must be eliminated, including non-cost based disparities between rates paid by carriers and end users. 98 The Commission
has found that the political climate is such that it may be many
years before such absolute equality can be achieved. 199 Thus,
many users often obtain rates for access quite different from
carriers' rates. In today's regulatory environment, end users,2 °°
enhanced service vendors,20 ' and even some data service carri197.

November 26, 1986 Memorandum, supra note 190.

198. Generally, it is recognized that pre-competitive telephone prices were based
largely on social considerations rather than on marginal cost-economic considerations.
This resulted in having long haul toll rates higher than the associated economic costs
and short haul or distribution rates lower than associated economic costs. See, e.g.,
Market Structure (Phase I), 93 F.C.C.2d 241, 251-53 (1983); W.BOLTER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE 1980s, THE TRANSITION TO COMPETITION 168-69 (1984). See
also generally OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY, FCC, WORKING PAPER, SOCIAL OBJECTIVES AND COMPETITION IN COMMON CARRIER COMMUNICATION:
INSEPARABLE? (1980).

INCOMPARABLE OR

199. For example, the Commission adopted rules which would require tariffs
which recovered the bulk of what are called "local loop costs" from end users on a
flat-rate basis. See Third Report and Order, 93 F.C.C.2d para. 3 at 243. Under intense
pressure from Congress, the FCC decided to phase in these rates much more slowly.
See FirstReconsiderationOrder,97 F.C.C.2d paras. 15-37 at 690-97. See generally Second Reconsideration Order, 97 F.C.C.2d para. 4-30 at 836-43. Residential customers
now pay $2.00 per month, per line, to cover interstate loop costs. The remainder of
the intrastate costs of residential loops are recovered through the traffic sensitive
"Carrier Common Line" charge. Third Report and Order, 93 F.C.C.2d para. 138-49 at
283-85. See generally Second ReconsiderationOrder, 97 F.C.C.2d para. 3 at 835 n.3
(the Commission deemed it necessary to "revise" the specific amount and the duration of the phase-in period for the end user subscriber line access charge given, inter
alia, Congressional pressure resulting from political realities). See also FCC News,
Mimeo No. 1946 (Jan. 14, 1984) (the Commission decided to delay end user access
charges for residential and single line business customers in light of requests from
citizens and public officials).
200. The category of end users would include residential and business exchange
customers.
201. Enhanced service vendors are classified as noncarriers and are exempt from
certain federal access charges paid by carriers. Computer III, Supplemental Notice,
FCC 86-253, paras. 24-47.
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ers20 2 have been granted access rights by regulators which are
different from those available to interexchange carriers.
Moreover, as large users increasingly construct their own
networks, economic discrimination between carriers and end
users will become more and more apparent and conflicts between the FCC's policies and those of the court more difficult
to ignore. For example, a large business user may interconnect
a PBX switch 20 1 with a local carrier's exchange switch over a
business telephone line. The regulated price of such a business
line may, in many jurisdictions, be far less than the rate which
would be charged for the identical connection were the PBX
switch deemed to be located on the premises of an interstate
carrier, although the functions and usage may be identical.
The district court's November 26, 1986 Memorandum20 4 could
therefore dramatically change the way telephone services are
priced. It is unclear at this time how far the district court will
go in attempting to impose a standard of absolute equality
among all customers for exchange access. US WEST had opposed the November 26, 1986 Memorandum, arguing that the
MFJ's equal access provisions required equality among interexchange carriers, but left other pricing decisions to appropriate regulatory agencies. 20 5 If the district court's memorandum
is upheld on appeal, there will be a direct conflict between the
FCC's regulatory policies, as well as those of state regulators,
and the regulatory policies of the Department of Justice and
the court.
C.

Open Network Architecture

As part of its statutory jurisdiction over interstate telecommunications policy, the FCC, in Computer 111,206 devised a con202. See WATS-Related and Other Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's
Rules, Second Report and Order in Docket No. 86-1, FCC 86-377, paras. 12-13, nn.45 &
48 (released Aug. 26, 1986).
203. A PBX is a "Private Branch Exchange" device. In today's technology, they
are generally computer-based common-controlled electronic machines that provide
switching and rather numerous optional calling features such as conferencing, call
forwarding, call hold, and the like. They can also be programmed to do accounting
and similar types of computer functions. See, e.g., 1987 GEODESIC NETWORK REPORT,
supra note 195, at 16.1-.3.
204. See supra note 190.
205. See US WEST Memorandum in Opposition to AT&T's Emergency Motion to
Compel US WEST to Comply with Non-Discriminatory Provisions of Decree at 18-36,
United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192 (D.D.C.) (Nov. 18, 1986).
206. See infra note 208.
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cept known as Open Network Architecture (ONA). 7 ONA is
designed to meet regulatory nondiscrimination rules and antitrust equal access requirements. The FCC proposes to implement this concept on an industry-wide basis beginning in early
1988. Implementation of the ONA concept and justification for
continuing the line-of-business restrictions was based on the
fear of discriminatory treatment of telecommunications
suppliers.
In August of 1985, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rule
Making205 to eliminate the fully separate subsidiary conditions
applied to AT&T and the BOCs with respect to enhanced services.2°9 The Report and Order210 which sets forth the procedures and methods for removing the structural separation
(fully separate subsidiary) requirements for the provision of
enhanced services establishes the competitive principles of
Comparably Efficient Interconnection (CEI) and the broader
application thereof-Open Network Architecture.211
Both CEI and ONA combine the specific application of the
prior telephone industry requirements of the duty of all carriers to provide reasonable interconnection of facilities to other
local and long distance carriers with the antitrust concept of
requiring an entity that controls an essential facility to allow
reasonable access to competitors.
Implicit in CEI is the concept that if a BOC proposes to offer
207. The Comparably Efficient Interconnection (CEI) and Open Network Architecture (ONA) concepts are explained in detail at infra notes 207-31 and accompanying text. Briefly, CEI is a concept applied by the FCC on a service-specific basis prior
to the time a carrier's generic ONA plan is established. If a carrier wishes to provide
an enhanced service, CEI requires the carrier to offer its basic carrier interconnections on an unbundled comparable basis to its enhanced service division and to unaffiliated competitors. ONA is an overall design plan whereby enhanced services of a
carrier and its competitors would be interconnected to the carriers' basic monopoly
services.
208. Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry) and Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Thereof, Communications Protocols
Under Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations in Docket No. 85229, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,581 (Aug. 20, 1985).
209. Id. paras. 6-24.
210. Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Thereof, Communications Protocols
Under Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Report and Order
in Docket No. 85-229, FCC 86-252, 60 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 683 (released June 16,
1986), summarized in 51 Fed. Reg. 24,350 (July 3, 1986).
211. Computer III, Report and Order, para. 100.
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a specific enhanced service, it must offer network interconnection opportunities to others that are comparable to the interconnection that its own enhanced service enjoys. 212

The

purpose of CEI is to serve the dual goals of permitting carriers
to make enhanced services available to the public in the most
efficient manner possible, while promoting the continued development of competition in the enhanced services marketplace.213 This concept is based on the premise that although
BOCs' local network facilities are increasingly subject to competition, the BOCs still possess substantial market power in
providing network access for most end users other than large
companies. 4 In Computer III, the FCC concluded that AT&T
should also be subject to CEI because of its strong presence in
the interexchange basic service markets. 1
The specific parameters that the FCC adopted are designed
to ensure that the BOC carriers make basic services available to
other enhanced service providers in a flexible but equally efficient manner. 6 The FCC/CEI provisions require BOC carriers to make available to other providers comparable
standardized interfaces, 7 unbundled basic services, 8 equal
technical characteristics,2 1 9 equal installation, maintenance and
repair, and equal end user access 2 20 at the same time that the

BOC offers its enhanced service to the public.221
The more general ONA concept that the FCC adopted embodies the overall design of a BOC carrier's basic network facilities and services to permit all users of the basic network,
including the enhanced service operations of the carrier and its
competitors, and all other carriers and users, to interconnect to
212. Id. para. 112.
213. Id. para. 128.
214. Id. para. 129.
215. Id para. 130.
216. Id. para. 154.
217. Id. para. 157. An interface can be described as a point where one type of facility or service connects to another type of facility or service. G. LANGLEY, infra note
217, s.v. "interface." A common example is the modular telephone jack used when a
telephone set interconnects to inside building telephone wires. Interfaces may involve hardware, software, electronic frequency power or similar attributes.
218. Id. para. 158. This means that services defined as basic under Computer II
must be disaggregated.
219. Id. para. 160. This includes transmission parameters and quality such as
bandwidth, bit rate, error rate, delay distortions, reliability, and time between
failures.

220. Id. paras. 161-62.
221. Id. para. 163.
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specific basic network functions and interfaces on an unbundied and equal basis.222 When this overall ONA design is
adopted by a specific carrier, it will eliminate the necessity that
the carrier address the above-described CEI requirements on a
service-by-service basis.223
As adopted by the FCC, ONA requires that the BOC carriers
provide unbundled Basic Service Elements 224 to others on a
tariffed basis.225 The Basic Service Elements are required to be
provided on the same terms, conditions, and rates to all users,
including the BOC itself. 226 Such Basic Service Elements must

be available to the public within one year of approval of the
carrier's ONA Plan. 227 The carrier's proposed ONA plan will

be subject to public comment and FCC approval,228 and must
comply with FCC cost allocation and other safeguards. 229 The
carriers' ONA plans are required to be filed on or before February 1, 1988.230 After the carrier's basic ONA plan is approved,
subsequent modification will require ninety days' advance notice to allow enhanced service competitors to develop new offerings on a competitive basis.23 '
In addition to the fundamental requirements of CEI and
ONA, the FCC is imposing additional non-structural requirements. These include cost allocation procedures,23 2 network disclosure obligations,3 3 and restrictions on the use of customer
proprietary network information.23 4
This highly sophisticated regulatory structure is directed, in
part, to precisely the same antitrust issues-denial of access
and cross-subsidization-utilized to justify the MFJ's injunctive
restrictions. Moreover, because this FCC policy is also based on
the Commission's statutory authority to set national telecom222. Id. paras. 113, 154, 162-66 n.219.
223. I& paras. 166 n.219 & 190-91.
224. Id, para. 158. Specific Basic Service Elements remain to be defined in each
carrier's ONA plan. Examples of possible Basic Service Elements could be provision
of the calling party's number identification, transmission capacity, or other features.
225. Id. para. 214.
226. Id. para. 215.
227. Id. paras. 216-19.
228. Id, para. 220.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. paras. 221-22.
232. Id. paras. 223, 234-40.
233. Id paras. 223, 246-55.
234. Id. paras. 223, 260-65.
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munications policy to further the broad public interest, the
Commission has much broader ability to react to marketplace
realities than does the Department of Justice or the district
court and the FCC need not rely on such simplistic notions as a
total market ban in order to effectuate its policy. There is significant evidence that the direct and indirect costs of preventive regulatory measures are now inordinately high, resulting
in higher prices to consumers and under utilization of the public switched network. 35 The FCC's ONA concept provides a
unique basis for comparison between public interest regulation
by an expert agency and similar regulation under the guise of
the antitrust laws by the Department of Justice and the district
court.
In the access area, the MFJ presumes that exchange services
constitute bottleneck monopoly services which will be equally
available to all only if exchange carriers are in no other business. Underlying this assumption is the antitrust concept that
any entity which controls a facility which must be relied on by
its competitors has a duty to permit those competitors to have
access to the essential facility on reasonable terms and conditions. 36 However, this legal principle is applicable only if the
entity has monopoly power 237 and owns or controls an essential
facility,238 and the competitor's ability to compete in the relevant market is necessary to the competitor's commercial existence in the product or service line. If these premises are
accurate, the entity controlling the bottleneck cannot deny ac235. See Fowler, Halprin & Schlichting, Back to the Future: A Model for Telecommunications,38 FED. COMM. L.J. 145, 184 (1986).
236. Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366, 377-79 (1973);U.S. v. St. Louis Terminal, 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1912); Hecht v. Pro- Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978). The doctrine has been applied in some telecommunications cases. See MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 604 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C. 1984); United States v. GTE, 603 F. Supp.
730, 732-33 (D.D.C. 1984); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 583 F. Supp. 1257, 1259
(D.D.C. 1984); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1345-46
(D.D.C. 1981); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 852 n.7, 868 n.90,
874 n.121 (D.D.C. 1984).
237. Monopoly power is the ability to exclude competitors or control prices in the
relevant geographic and product markets. See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 462-63
(1980).
238. An essential facility exists where competitors' products or services cannot be
produced or marketed without use of the facility and the facility cannot be duplicated.
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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cess to its competitors, subject to capacity limitations and willingness to pay reasonable, nondiscriminatory prices.

The FCC's ONA structure also addresses a concern known as
cross-subsidization. Under this concept an entity with monopoly power in one market could theoretically require excessive
monopoly prices in such a market and use the excess revenues
to support products or services in a competitive market at predatory, below-cost prices. The district court in the AT&T divestiture case defined cross-subsidization as subsidization of
"prices in competitive markets with supracompetitive profits
earned in the monopoly market. ' 2

9

The theory advanced by

the proponents of the MFJ is that an exchange carrier will deliberately price competitive services below cost in order to
drive competitors out of business-sustaining these below-cost
operations by shifting their costs to regulated rate base accounts. Thus, cross-subsidization is viewed as a type of predatory pricing-evidence of an intent to monopolize which can
give rise to antitrust liability. 240 The MFJ theory also expressly
assumes that regulatory agencies are not competent to prevent
exchange carriers from recovering the costs of unregulated
services through prices paid by telephone ratepayers.241
Despite the general acceptance of the cross-subsidization issue as a matter of genuine and legitimate concern addressed
appropriately in the MFJ, the cross-subsidization analysis
which underlies the MFJ does not stand up under rigorous examination. The entire theory of predatory pricing predicated
on cross-subsidization as an antitrust violation has been subject
to serious questions, both generally 242 and in the context of the
MFJ itself.243 In fact, AT&T has never lost an antitrust case

based on a cross-subsidization
filings.244

claim, despite

numerous

239. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 187.
240. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION para. 711a at 150-51 (1978).
241. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 167-68, 187 n.229.
242. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1354-60 (1986).
See also 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 235, para. 711a at 150-52; McGee,

PredatoryPricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289, 290-300 (1980).
243. See Brock & Evans, Predation: A Critique of the Government's Case in US v.
AT&T, in BREAKING Up BELL: ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 54-56, 59 (D.S. Evans ed. 1983).

244. See MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081,
1111-28 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Northeastern Tel. Co. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 86-91 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943
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More significantly, the FCC has much more flexibility to define and allocate costs than does the Department of Justice or
the district court, and thus is the more effective point of regulation. In an antitrust context, predatory pricing based on crosssubsidization from a monopoly service cannot be found unless
the price for the competitive service is below what is known as
245
marginal cost or an available surrogate for marginal cost.
Marginal cost analysis focuses on the cost of producing the good
or service in question, and whether or not the overall costs of
24 6
operating the total combined enterprise are meaningful.
Utilizing this approach is consistent with the antitrust laws,
and is the method almost unanimously accepted by the
courts.2 4 7

Regulators, on the other hand, by virtue of their authority to
regulate prices of services, often require that costs which are
not directly assignable to any particular product or service be
distributed to all products or services on the basis of a prescribed formula. This methodology, known as fully distributed
costing,248 can result in competitive services bearing a much
heavier cost burden than would be required under the antitrust
laws, and has been uniformly rejected by courts examining
predatory pricing complaints.2 4 9
As a general principle, this article submits that regulators
should not rely on fully distributed cost principles in reviewing
the price of regulated services. However, the authority of the
FCC to utilize fully distributed cost standards as a regulatory
(1982); Southern Pac. Communications Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F. Supp.

825,914-72 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,470 U.S. 1005
(1985).
245. Marginal cost is generally considered to be the total additional cost per one
additional increment of output. See MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co, 708 F.2d at 1115; Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d
at 87-88; Jay Foods, Inc. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1073, 1077 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
246. For several basic descriptions of marginal costing theory, see 1 P. SAMUELSON,
ECONOMICS 453,469,640 (10th ed. 1976); 1 C. R. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES,
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES, 515, 537, 555 (6th ed. 1975); A. E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF

REGULATION 65-66 (1970).

247. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d at 1121-23.
"The... circuits have been virtually unanimous in their endorsement of a marginal
cost standard for predatory pricing." Id. at 1121.
248. See Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d 1221, 1236-47 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(Wilkey, J., dissenting), cert denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981).
249. See, e.g., MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d at
1115-23; Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d at 87-91; Southern Pac. Communications Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F. Supp. at 918-27; Jay
Foods, Inc. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 614 F. Supp. at 1078-84.
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device in fulfilling its public-interest mandate is well established, 250 and, should predatory pricing prove to be a problem,
regulatory agencies have far more authority under the law to
deal with such a problem than does the Department of Justice
or the district court under the antitrust laws. In fact, the Computer III ONA rules represent a specific response to perceived
cross- subsidization issues, 25 ' and the Commission is currently
engaged in a broad-ranging rulemaking proceeding designed to
develop cost assignment rules applicable to all competitive
services offered by regulated carriers.5 2
The ONA premise is that the public will benefit from a truly
competitive environment in which exchange carriers as well as
other competitors participate in the enhanced/information
services markets. This sophisticated regulatory structure developed by the FCC stands in stark contrast to the simplistic
information services and interexchange services prohibitions in
the MFJ. Contrary to the unsupported assumption that the
FCC is incapable of regulating telephone operations in the public interest (an assumption which, as noted, underlies the
MFJ's line-of-business restrictions), the Commission's actions
in these areas, as typified by ONA, provide solid evidence that
its regulatory jurisdiction is far superior to the narrow focus
which the Department of Justice and the district court bring to
telecommunications policy matters.

VI
Subsequent Developments Have Further
Obscured the Line Between Antitrust
Enforcement and Regulatory
Policy
Because competitive reality differs dramatically from the basic assumptions on which the MFJ's prospective injunctive provisions are predicated, it is not surprising that enforcement of
the MFJ in practice has proven to be an administrative quag250. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d at 1226.
251. See supra notes 234-35.
252. See Separation of Costs of Regulated Telephone Service from Costs of Nonregulated Activities; Amendment of Part 31, the Uniform System of Accounts for
Class A and Class B Telephone Companies, to Provide for Nonregulated Activities
and to Provide For Transactions between Telephone Companies and their Affiliates,
Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Docket No. 86-111, FCC 86-146, 104 F.C.C.2d 59
(1986). This proceeding is also referred to as "Part X."
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mire.25 The BOCs must seek permission from the Department
of Justice and the district court before they can provide any
service other than terminal equipment, printed directories, or
exchange telecommunications. The court has established procedures for this purpose, 25 4 and has even held an oral argument
on one occasion. 255 A significant backlog of waiver requests

currently waits to be decided.
The established procedures virtually ensure that a BOC will
be precluded from offering any new specific service for up to a
year or more. In order to comply with the procedural requirements, a proposal must be first submitted to the Department of
Justice for review. If the Department agrees with the proposal,
it subsequently presents the proposal, in the form of a motion,
to the district court, which then decides whether or not the
BOC should be permitted to provide the proposed service. If
the Department disagrees, months, or even years, can transpire
before any further action is taken. The end result is that the
Department and the district court perform the functions of a
new federal administrative agency deciding which new services
the divested BOCs are permitted to provide and which restrictions, if any, should be imposed as a condition of such entry.
This procedure delays or denies the RBOCs the exercise of fun253. Between January 1, 1984 and October 1, 1986, there were more than 1,300
pleadings filed with the district court on MFJ interpretation and waiver issues. In
addition, there were over 100 motions filed by the RBOCs and their subsidiaries with
the Department of Justice requesting authority to enter new lines of business, of
which approximately eighty have been transmitted by the Department of Justice to
the court and subsequently granted. Approximately 30 such requests were pending at
the Department of Justice on October 1st. See generally The Federal Telecommunications Policy Act of 1986: Hearings on S. 2565 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation,99th Cong. 2d Sess. 6-7 (1986) (testimony of
Douglas H. Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (discussing the chaos of MFJ administration/enforcement).
254. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal
dismissed, United States v. Western Elec. Co., 777 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (US WEST
Appellant) (hereinafter LOB Procedures Decision).
255. See Hearing before U.S. District Court Judge Harold H. Greene, United States
v. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. (D.D.C. 1986) (No. 82-0192) (held Aug. 9, 1985);
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. at 1110 n.91. At issue were motions
for clarification of the MFJ to provide cellular radio services, voice storage, and retrieval services to cellular customers and shared telecommunications services, filed by
Ameritech Corporation, a motion for a declaratory ruling filed by Pacific Telesis
Group that it can provide exchange telecommunication services outside of California
and Nevada, and a motion for declaratory ruling filed by New Vector Communications, Inc. (a subsidiary of US WEST) that it can provide cellular exchange radio services outside of the 14 state operating territory of US WEST's three telephone
companies.
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damental economic freedom to provide any lawful services of
their choosing. In addition, the process interferes with the
BOCs' ability to purchase other companies, since few are willing or able to withstand the delay and uncertainty inherent in
the waiver process. 56
Three other unanticipated developments following entry of
the MFJ have even further clouded the regulatory scene and
exacerbated the already untenable situation created by the
MFJ's line-of-business restrictions.
The first of these developments is the unexpected emergence
of AT&T as the primary plaintiff in enforcing the MFJ's injunctive provisions against the BOCs. During the quasi-Tunney
Act proceeding,257 AT&T had repeatedly asserted that the lineof-business restrictions imposed on the divested BOCs were entirely the idea of the Department of Justice, 58 that AT&T opposed the imposition of such restrictions, 259 and that it agreed
to them only as part of its overall bargain to free itself from the
restrictions in the 1956 consent decree. 2 ° After divestiture had
been accomplished, however, AT&T altered this position and
assumed the role of the primary advocate of preservation, enforcement, and expansion of the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions. For example, AT&T has complained to the district court
that BOC provision of shared tenant services,26 ' private line
256. On December 9, 1986, AT&T filed a motion with the district court requesting
that the court transfer the responsibility for reviewing line-of-business waivers and
filing them from the Department of Justice to the FCC. If this request is granted, the
waiver process would be even further complicated.
257. See supra note 4.
258. See Reply Comments of AT&T, at 104-05, (filed May 21, 1982), United States v.
Western Elec. Co. (AT&7) 552 F. Supp 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (No. 82-0192).
259. Id.
260. Id. US WEST, in a recent appeal, asserted that AT&T's representation of the
interests of the to-be-divested operating companies rose to the level of a fiduciary, and
that AT&T, due to a conflict of interest, was legally incapable of binding the operating
companies to post-divestiture restrictions on their lawful business operations. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected this argument, holding
that a parent corporation's fiduciary obligation to a subsidiary, to the extent it exists,
does not enable a divested subsidiary to avoid contractual obligations imposed prior to
a divestiture. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 797 F.2d 1082, 1087-89 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (Bell Atlantic Corp., Pacific Telesis Group and US WEST Appellants).
261. Shared tenant services involve the competitive provision of a variety of communications services, including switching and transport, to customers within a single
building or group of buildings through a PBX or other premises-based switching vehicle. See AT&T's Response to Ameritech's Motion for Clarification of the Decree Regarding the Provision of Shared Telecommunications Services, at 2-4, (filed Feb. 11,
1985) United States v. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp 1090 (D.D.C. 1986) (No. 82-0192).
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22263financial services,
ao servev
switching,2 6 2 certain
and operator
264
ices
violate the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions, and has
repeatedly lobbied the Department of Justice seeking to utilize
the MFJ to block BOC services such as "800 access. ' 265 In fact,
AT&T even attempted to utilize the MFJ to prevent US WEST
from settling an antitrust lawsuit, 266 and recently obtained a

ruling from the district court that it was entitled by the MFJ to
exchange access at the same rates as are available to any other
customer.2 6 7

AT&T's emergence as plaintiff in seeking protection under
the MFJ from BOC competition creates some highly significant
anomalies, because AT&T's primary lines of business duplicate
the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions. In a very real sense,
AT&T is able to impede competition by the very consent decree
which terminated the antitrust suit charging AT&T with unlawfully impeding competition. AT&T is thus often in the unusual position of claiming that the operations of the BOCs
should be even more limited than required by the language of
the MFJ, which in turn puts an even greater regulatory burden
on the Department of Justice and the district court.
The second unanticipated development following divestiture
was the district court's extension of its authority to encompass
262. See AT&T's Motion to Compel Pacific Northwest Bell to Comply with the
Decree, at 1-2, United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 17,
1984); AT&T's Reply in Further Support of Its Motion to Compel Pacific Northwest
Bell to Comply with the Decree, at 1,20-27, United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 820192 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 14, 1984). Although private lines are by definition point-topoint, a variety of private lines can be interconnected through a switch.
263. Specifically, AT&T objected to US WEST's financial services subsidiary providing financing for any company which engaged in manufacturing activities. See, e.g.,
AT&T Response to US WEST's Request to Provide Financial Services and to Engage
in Financing Transactions, at 2-3, United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192
(D.D.C. filed Mar. 29, 1985).
264. See AT&T's Motion for Declaratory Ruling on Operator Call Handling, at 1-2,
United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 20, 1986).
265. See Letter from Francine J. Berry, Assistant General Counsel, AT&T, to Kevin R. Sullivan, Assistant Chief, U.S. Department of Justice (May 28, 1985). "800 access" is exchange access for interexchange calls utilizing the prefix "800" instead of an
area code.
266. Specifically, AT&T contended that US WEST could not settle the MCI antitrust suit in Chicago because US WEST had committed to loan MCI sums of money as
part of the settlement. AT&T contended that such a loan would violate the MFJ. See
Letter from Jim G. Kilpatrick, Corporate Vice President and General Attorney,
AT&T, to Kevin R. Sullivan, Assistant Chief, U.S. Department of Justice (April 5,
1985).
267. The district court agreed with AT&T on this issue in its November 26, 1986
Memorandum. See supra note 190.
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regulation of telephone rates and performance of other similar
functions normally entrusted to regulatory authorities. As
noted in the preceding sections, the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions significantly overlap with the statutory regulatory
framework established in the Communications Act in practically all material respects. The district court, in interpreting its
authority, has gone even further and has, in essence, asserted
regulatory power over telephone operations and services having nothing to do with either the antitrust laws or the MFJ.
The district court has consistently focused on such regulatory
issues, both in examining requests to enter new lines of business under section VIII(C) of the MFJ and in interpreting the
MFJ's injunctive provisions.
For example, in July of 1984, the district court issued a detailed ruling on a number of pending requests by BOCs to enter
new lines of business.2 6 In this ruling the district court, inter
alia,ruled that requests by BOCs to enter new lines of business
would not be granted unless the activities covered by such requests have total estimated net revenues that do not exceed
"10% of [a] Regional [Holding] Company['s] total estimated net
revenues." 26 9 In imposing this and other conditions, the district
court did not direct its analysis to competitive issues, strictly
speaking, but instead concentrated on such regulatory matters
as "ensur[ing] the viability of the local telephone companies...
and reduc[ing] upward pressures on local telephone rates, '2 7 0
preventing operating companies from neglecting their "basic
responsibility.., to provide local telephone service to the public, '271 and the court's perceived responsibility to "ensure that
the public's telephone service does not suffer, but improves in
' 272
quality and price.
In another decision "interpreting" the terms of the MFJ, the
court again stated that ensuring high-quality, low-cost telephone service was "an essential ingredient" in the administration of the MFJ.2 73 The court also criticized the divested BOCs
268. See LOB ProceduresDecision, 592 F. Supp. at 850 n.3.
269. US WEST appealed this decision. The appellate court dismissed this appeal
on the basis that the "conditions" did not represent a final decision that new businesses could not be entered in their absence. See United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
777 F.2d at 25 (US WEST Appellant).
270. LOB ProceduresDecision, 592 F. Supp. at 856.
271. Id. at 861.
272. Id. at 867.

273. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. 1090, 1096 n.18 (D.D.C. 1986).
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for forsaking the service mentality which had previously permeated the Bell System." 4 The court further ruled that the
MFJ did not
distribute the bulk of the assets of the American Telephone
and Telegraph Company to the Regional Companies to enable
the managers of these companies to use them as building
blocks for the establishment of conglomerates unrelated or
only marginally related to basic telephone service for the
American public." 5
In this decision, the court also discovered another regulatory
mandate--the furtherance of national defense. 6 The overlap
between the MFJ and regulatory authority was thus extended
far beyond even the provisions of the MFJ itself.
Reliance on these regulatory principles has led to the third
unanticipated post-divestiture development-efforts by the
court, the Department of Justice, AT&T, and others to expand
the injunctive provisions of the MFJ beyond the scope of its
terms, based on unstated purposes found nowhere in the consent decree itself. It is, of course, fundamental that the terms
of a consent decree will be interpreted as written, not as they
might have been written to meet the purpose of one of the parties. 7 Furthermore, no consent decree can be said to have a
purpose itself beyond the terms of the agreement negotiated by
the parties. 2 78 The district court has repeatedly ignored the essential premise of the controlling Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Armour & Co. 279 and has sought to justify its
rulings on the basis of what it terms the MFJ's "principles and
' 28 0
purposes.
The most dramatic example of such reliance on "principles
and purposes" to expand the MFJ beyond its written terms oc274. Id. at 1095-96.

275. Id. at 1096 n.21.
276. "Competition among these companies with respect to exchange service could,

and no doubt in short order would .... jeopardize both the quality of the services
provided by the national telecommunications network as well as the national defense
and emergency requirements of that network." Id. at 1108.
277. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 61, 573-76 (1984);
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971); United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 234-35 (1975).
278. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. at 235-36.
279. 402 U.S. 673 (1971). The Court held: "[T]he [consent decree] instrument must
be construed as it is written, and not as it might have been written had the plaintiff
established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation." 402 U.S. at 682.
280. See Memorandum Order, United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192
(D.D.C. filed Feb. 14, 1986).
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curred when one regional company, Bell Atlantic, was ordered
to divest its ownership of a company which provided paging
services within LATAs in parts of the country where Bell Atlantic did not provide traditional exchange service. While the
terms of the MFJ did not prohibit Bell Atlantic from offering
such service, the district court nevertheless found that a geographical restriction on where Bell Atlantic could provide exchange service was in keeping with the overall purposes of the
decree.8 1 In a recent. decision, representing the only occasion
to date in which the district court has been reversed on an issue
arising out of the MFJ, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled that, under Armour and United States
v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,282 the new restriction imposed
by the district court could not be sustained. 28 3 Thus, the court
of appeals ruled that any service which a BOC could lawfully
provide under the MFJ could be provided anywhere in the
country.
Moreover, in the context of AT&T's assumed role as plaintiff
in enforcing the injunctive provisions of the MFJ, reliance on
"purposes" of the consent decree beyond the strict language of
the decree itself could produce especially perverse results.
Normally a consent decree is interpreted as a contract, and the
law presumes that the interests of the bound parties were represented during arms-length negotiations.8 4 If AT&T's purpose in agreeing to the post-divestiture line-of-business
restrictions on behalf of the BOCs was, as it now appears, to
protect itself from competition, it can have no relevance in interpreting ambiguities in the MFJ. Similarly, the Department
of Justice's unilateral purposes cannot be controlling-or even
awarded special weight.
While this key issue is by no means settled,28 5 application of
basic principles of contract law would result in interpretation
of the MFJ strictly according to its terms, with ambiguities in
281. See, e.g., LOB Procedures Decision, 592 F. Supp. at 855-58; United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. at 1093-94 n.60.
282. See supra note 277.
283. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 797 F.2d 1082, 1089-91 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(Bell Atlantic Corp., Pacific Telesis Group, U.S. WEST, Inc. Appellants) petitionfor
cert.filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3,373 (Nov. 13, 1986) (No. 86-776).
284. See, e.g., Willie M. v. Hunt, 657 F.2d 55, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1981).
285. The court of appeals, in ruling on the "outside of the region" issue, deferred
the issue of which legal standards govern interpretation of the Decree. See United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 797 F.2d at 1089-92 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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the MFJ's language being strictly construed against its drafters-AT&T and the Department of Justice.2 86
The combination of AT&T's assumption of the role of plaintiff, the district court's assumption of regulatory authority, and
the use of unstated decree purposes to expand the MFJ's injunctive requirements serves to exacerbate the gulf between
the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions and reality. Thus, in current practice, the MFJ is enforced as an open-ended injunction
which further mires the district court in regulatory policy
matters.

VII
The MFJ's Line-of-Business Restrictions are
Anticompetitive
The conflict between the realities of the telecommunications
marketplace and the line-of-business restrictions underscores
the fundamental principle that antitrust decree provisions
should not restrict competition and cannot lawfully undercut
basic antitrust goals. 287 Similarly, antitrust decrees should not
impose "unnecessary restrictions,28' 9' 2 88 or "penalties in the guise
of preventing future violations.
This essential tenet of antitrust law was summarized in
United States v. ParamountPictures,Inc.,29 ° in which the district court rejected an attempt by the Department of Justice to
apply the Paramount movie industry consent decree to bar certain movie theater acquisitions:
This court has frequently stated that the Paramount decrees
cannot serve established exhibitors as a shelter against competition by new arrivals. The overriding public interest is to foster and encourage competition. Any attempt to enforce
286. 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 621, at 760-62 (3d
ed. 1961). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981); 3 CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 559 at 262-71 (1960 & Kaufman Supp. 1980); Gray v. American Exp. Co., 743 F.2d 10, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Barrette v. Home Lines, Inc., 168 F.
Supp. 141, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-96 (1972).
287. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326-28
(1961); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 359 (1947); United States v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944); United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 728-29 (1944).
288. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 156 (1951).
289. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 409, clarified, 324 U.S. 570
(1945).
290. 333 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D.N.Y.), qffd sub nom. Syufy Enter. v. United States, 404
U.S. 802 (1971).
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competitive limitations designed to keep out a newly arrived
competitor .... far from serving the public interest in competition, would eliminate the public benefits of competition. The
stresses and strain of competition are intended to permit flexibility and improvements-a process that may well involve
hardship for some while creating prosperity for others. 291
Anticompetitive provisions have been routinely stricken
from antitrust decrees. For example, in United States v. National Lead Co.,292 the Supreme Court overturned a litigated
decree designed to remedy the effects of a patent pool which
had been held to constitute a horizontal combination in violation of section one of the Sherman Act. The decree provisions
in question required the defendants to furnish, for a fee, all
information desired by any applicant relating to methods and
processes for manufacturing certain products. Since this provision would have discouraged new product development by the
defendants, the Supreme Court reversed:
The attempt of the Government to throw the field of technical
knowledge in the titanium pigment industry wide-open would
reduce the competitive value of the independent research of
the parties. It would discourage rather than encourage competitive research.2 9 3
In fact, it has long been held that "the antitrust laws were
enacted for the protection of competition, not competitors
.... "294 The antitrust laws were premised on the assumption
that the rigors of a competitive marketplace will themselves
produce efficiencies which benefit the public and these laws
may not be applied to "compel the very sloth they were intended to prevent. We must always be mindful lest the Sherman Act be invoked perversely in favor of those who seek
protection against the rigors of competition."2 9
The MFJ's line-of-business restrictions violate this fundamental premise of the antitrust laws. By needlessly restricting
competition and protecting existing competitors such as AT&T
from the rigors of the marketplace, these injunctive provisions
291. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 333 F. Supp. at 1105-06.
292. 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
293. Id. at 359.
294. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (emphasis in original).
295. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
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contradict the very pro-competitive policies which the Sherman Act was designed to promote.
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that the MFJ's
line-of-business restrictions unnecessarily usurp regulatory authority entrusted by statute to the FCC. Furthermore, these
restrictions are entirely unnecessary, regardless of which
agency regulates national telecommunications policy. Tested
under proper antitrust standards, the MFJ's line-of-business
restrictions are inconsistent with the basic antitrust principles
29 6
by which they are purportedly justified.
Proper antitrust analysis begins by defining the relevant
market or markets.2 97 As previously noted, the MFJ's most rudimentary assumption is that there exists in the telecommunications environment a discrete niche market called exchange
service-a market which is a natural monopoly bottleneck on
which all competitors in all other telecommunications and information markets must rely. In reality, the notion that there
is a severable, economically sustainable exchange services market is erroneous and had been rejected in practice by the time
the MFJ was implemented.2 98 Rather, the relevant industry
market includes the nationwide information services industry,
which includes both the telecommunications exchange and interexchange markets as well as the computer market. 29 9 The
scope of this information industry and market has been clearly
identified by the two major United States suppliers, AT&T and
IBM, as well as by others.3 00 The industry structure includes
296. The MFJ's anticompetitive restrictions stand out starkly in contrast to other
antitrust divestitures. For example, using the logic which underlies the MFJ's lineof-business restrictions, the Standard Oil, American Tobacco, Northern Securities,
Union Pacific Railroad, and Grinnell Alarm Services divestitures would likewise have
prohibited the divested companies from competing with each other or with the divesting company. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106 (1910); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
297. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394400 (1956).
298. By defining MFJ exchange areas (LATAs) to encompass many traditional exchanges, the BOCs in essence are permitted to provide interexchange service-albeit
within limited geographic areas. LOB Procedures Decision, 592 F. Supp. at 855-58.
299. For example, both of the leading suppliers, IBM and AT&T, have described
their business as basically including the products, services and systems for nationwide
movement and management of information. For the specific IBM & AT&T definitions of the relevant market see infra note 300.
300.
AT&T's overall mission is to provide its customers, worldwide, with prod-
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several fully integrated suppliers which provide all relevant
functions including basic research and development, equipment
design and engineering, manufacture of a broad range of telecommunications and computer equipment for other suppliers
and end-user consumers, end-to-end wholesale services and
end-to-end retail services. 0 1 Each of these enterprises can
compete in virtually all aspects of the information services
industry.
The industry is also rapidly becoming horizontally integrated. For example, AT&T and the IBM group 3 0 2 both supply
ucts, services and systems for the movement and management of information.
The Company offers domestic and international long distance telecommunications services that can be interconnected with the information systems of
AT&T and others.
The company also designs, manufactures, markets and services equipment
for telecommunications networks; information systems, including computers,
and networks for offices and factories; telephone products for homes and
businesses; and related electronic components for high technology products
Our goal is to become the leading international provider of information
movement and management products and services in the 1990s.
AMERICAN TEL. & TEL. Co., 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1986).
IBM's operations are primarily in the field of information- handling systems,
equipment and services to solve the increasingly complex problems of business, government, science, space exploration, defense, education, medicine
and many other areas of human activity. IBM's products include information
processing products and systems, program products, telecommunications systems, information distributors, office systems, typewriters, copiers, educational and testing materials, and related supplies and services. Most products
are both leased and sold through IBM's worldwide marketing organizations
....
IBM is well-positioned to participate fully in meeting the expanding
worldwide demand for information processing technology. The company also
continues to explore additional avenues for future growth, including participation in joint ventures where IBM's strengths complement those of other
leading companies in the pursuit of new and promising business
opportunities.
Id. at 1-3.
301. "End-to-end" telecommunications services are provided when a single supplier provides all elements of a communications service. The philosophical premise of
the MFJ is that provisions of end-to-end service was anticompetitive because only
local exchange carriers would provide such service. Large businesses, however, have
sufficiently sophisticated internal communications needs that it is often uneconomical
for them to utilize local exchange carriers-and they can purchase end-to-end service
from AT&T or other carriers (or provide their own service). See infra note 309.
302. IBM and ROLM Corporation merged in 1984. ROLM, however, operates as a
wholly-owned subsidiary under its own name. See INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1985). IBM also has acquired a substantial minority
interest in MCI in exchange for the transfer of Satellite Business Systems Communications Company from IBM to MCI.
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computer and telecommunications equipment, software products and services, engineering, installation and maintenance
services, information database preparation and management,
interexchange telecommunications services, network design
and management, all types of telecommunications equipment,
and exchange access services for business customers. Thus, the
MFJ's line-of-business restrictions are based on an outdated
market definition that erroneously assumes there are significantly different markets for exchange telecommunications and
for interexchange telecommunications. 303
The existing line-of-business restrictions prohibit the BOCs
from competing effectively with companies like AT&T and the
IBM Group even in those business areas which the MFJ assumes to be natural monopolies.' °4 For example, in one area
key to modern competitive success, the BOCs are prohibited
from gaining the economic advantages of vertical integration. 5
To illustrate, a normal retail supplier may reduce its economic
costs by backward integration, that is, by establishing a wholesale function or a manufacturing function. Such integration
may provide a supplier with lower costs and permit a supplier
to charge its customers lower prices. Vertical integration may
give a supplier more rapid access to needed market information
and significant economies of scale. Customers also have the advantage of dealing with a single supplier, thus reducing customer and supplier transaction time and costs.
303. A similar array of services is provided by General Telephone and Electronics
Corporation. AT&T and IBM are over three times the size of most RBOCs. For example, in terms of 1985 annual sales and employees the relative sizes of AT&T, IBM,
GTE and US WEST are as follows:
Sales
Employees
Company
(Millions)
(Thousands)
IBM
$ 50,100
405
AT&T
34,910
338
GTE
15,732
183
US WEST
7,813
70
Sesit, Monroe & Truell, Prosperity and Peril in the Brave New Market, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 29, 1986 (A Special Report, Global Finance & Investing), at 17D-18D (citing Morgan Stanley Capital International Perspective and WSJ Tabulations, 1986).
304. See supra notes 6, 41 & 234 and accompanying texts.
305. See generally M.E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, 79, 92, 103-04, 276, 30809, 524 (1985). Although the BOCs are denied the economic and marketing benefits of
vertical integration through manufacturing, larger companies that compete for the
same BOC business customers and services, such as AT&T, IBM/Rolm/MCI and
GTE/Sprint, are all permitted to provide exchange telecommunication services with
equipment that they manufacture on an unrestricted basis (as it relates to vertical
integration).
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Denial of these benefits of vertical integration to the RBOCs
is antithetical to competition. At the same time, such denial is
unnecessary; on proper market examination, it is doubtful that
the RBOCs have any bona fide monopoly power, even if local
exchange telecommunications service is viewed as a separate
market segment (which it is not). Monopoly power or market
power is defined as the power to control prices or exclude competition in a defined market. 0 6 Clearly an individual RBOC, as
matched against IBM or AT&T, does not have monopoly power
in the information services market in the United States. Just
as clearly, an individual RBOC does not have monopoly power
in the national local exchange telecommunications services segment. °7 Thus the line-of-business restrictions simply hinder
competition.
The MFJ originally was designed to restrict the operations of
a single owner of all of the nationwide Bell local exchange companies.3 °8 The MFJ's line-of-business restrictions might have
been arguably necessary in order to protect competition if the
industry structure continued centralized control of all the former BOCs (as originally permitted in the consent decree). 9 In
such an event, implementation of the consent decree would
have resulted in an industry structure that continued a nationwide presence and control of some eighty percent of the nation's local exchange service providers under a single
centralized management. However, that centralized industry
structure was not implemented and AT&T's wholly-owned operating telephone companies were divided into seven separate
companies, each having about ten percent or less of the former
Bell System business and each being only approximately onethird the size of AT&T itself after divestiture. 10 When the in306. See United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956);
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 70-72 (1966).
307. In 1974, all of the Bell Operating Companies served about 82 percent of the
telephone exchange lines in the United States. See 1974 Complaint, supra note 42,
§ V, 13. These Operating Companies were divided among seven Regional Holding
Companies as a result of the divestiture proceeding. Thus no RBOC presently controls

more than about 10 percent of the nation's local exchange access lines.
308. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 223; MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 226.
309. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 224; MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 226.
310. This was desirable from AT&T's perspective. It avoided establishing a potential competitor to AT&T in the form of a single company in control of all divested
BOCs which would be approximately twice the size of AT&T and have a nationwide
presence. In lieu of a single owner, AT&T established seven separate regional companies to provide local exchange service. This had the advantage, from AT&T's competi-
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dependent telephone company segment is included, an individual RBOC would control only approximately seven percent of
the local exchange telecommunications equipment in the
United States. Even if such a company were fully vertically integrated, it would clearly not possess a market share at the
dominant or market power level deemed significant for anti311
trust purposes.
More significantly, the assumption that an RBOC has monopoly power with respect to local exchange telecommunications services within a particular geographical segment of the
United States is itself dubious due to the rapid changes in technology and the significant general increase in competition for
telecommunications services. Today there are numerous competitive alternatives available for large users of the BOC local
exchange facilities. 312 Bypass of an RBOC's local distribution
tive perspective, of creating companies which had only a regional presence, and which
had significantly less economic power than did AT&T itself.
311. Generally a company with less than a fifty percent market share has been
held not to have a monopoly. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S.
450 (1920). See also Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969).
Cf Hayden Pub. Co. v. Cox Broadcasting Corp., 730 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1984). Generally
size itself does not violate the Sherman Act. See United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 251 U.S. at 451; Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 658 (8th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957). See also Department of Justice Motion and
Proposed Order for a Waiver of Section II(D) of the MFJ to Permit Ameritech to
Engage in Certain Foreign Business Ventures, at 11, United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 1986-1 Trade Cas. 67, 179 (D.D.C.) No. 82-0192
While Ameritech is a substantial purchaser in the United States, it does not
have more than roughly 15% of the domestic telephone lines, clearly far
short of monopoly market power. On an international basis, Ameritech has
no market power to induce a foreign purchaser to enter a tying agreement or
reciprocal purchasing agreement.
Another example is that of AT&T as a dominant provider having over sixty-six percent of the 1984 sales in telecommunications equipment of the United States. See
Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1986 (A Special Report: Telecommunications Wrestling with
Choice) (Section 4), at 5D, citing Gartner Group, 1985.
312. The FCC has conducted two studies on bypass of BOC exchange facilities.
The first study was reported in 1983 and the second released in 1985. The second
study concluded (1) that bypass was occurring and would continue to grow, (2) that
direct links between the long distance carriers (such as AT&T and IBM/MCI) and
points with large concentration of traffic appeared the most likely source of growth in
bypass in the near future and (3) that bypass is likely to divert a great deal of traffic
from the public switched network. See "Bypass of the Public Switched Network,"
adopted by the Commission on December 19, 1984; In the Matter of MTS and WATS
Market Structure and Public Notice No. 3206 seeking Data, Information and Studies
Relating to Bypass of the Public Switched Network, Docket No. 78-72, Phase I, FCC
No. 84-635 and Mimeo No. 35408 (released Jan. 18, 1985) [hereinafter Second Bypass
Report]. This issue is also discussed in Fowler, Halprin & Schlicting, Back to the Future: A Model for Telecommunications, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 145, 188 (1986). The tech-
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facilities is economically feasible for virtually all customers, except for low volume diverse location telecommunications traffic
because prices for local exchange access by interexchange carriers are established on a regulatory policy basis rather than on a
market basis. The historical public regulatory policy prices access to carriers on a per call basis at rates which significantly
exceed economic marginal costs. Thus, large volume users and
interexchange carriers have an incentive to uneconomically bypass local exchange facilities even where the alternative bypass
facilities are not as economically efficient as existing exchange
facilities. Today virtually all interexchange carriers engage in
the provision of local exchange telecommunications service to

large users.31
nologies now available to bypass RBOC local exchange facilities to interconnect with
the interexchange network include the following: Private Microwave, Satellites,
Cable Networks, Cellular Mobile, Digital Termination Systems (DTS), FM and AM
Radio Broadcasting Technology (these include FM and AM subcarriers and telecom
Vertical Blanking Intervals (VBI) and fiber optics. See W. G. BOLTER, J.B. DUVALL,
F. J. KELSEY & J. W. MCCONNAUGHEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE 1980s:
THE TRANSITION TO COMPETITION 219-24 (1984) (authors are from the Bethesda Research Institute); J. L. RACSTER, M. D. WONG & J. GULDMANN, THE BYPASS ISSUE: AN
EMERGING FORM OF COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY 179-231 (1984) (au-

thors are from The National Regulatory Research Institute). It is reported that more
than one-quarter of New York City's top four hundred telephone users use some kind
of bypass to gain access to long- distance carriers. See Malcolm Gladwell, Shakedown-The Tangled Aftermath of the AT&T Breakup, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Sept.
15, 1986 (Insight Magazine), at 8. Additionally, some sixty percent of telephone company business revenues come from four percent of business users. These are the
users who are opting out of (i.e., bypassing) the system. Gladwell, id. at 12. For example, in Chicago, Fiber Optic Corp. runs its fiber optic bypass facilities (i.e., cable) to
only 21 buildings. Yet Fiber Optic needs only to sign up ten percent of the business
customers within the Chicago Loop in order to compete for 90 percent of all downtown Chicago's existing telephone revenues. Id.
AT&T is building communications networks for large businesses that connect directly to AT&T, bypassing the local exchange carriers. Such bypass service has been
provided by AT&T for Merrill Lynch in New York. See E. Tucker, AT&T Plans to
Bypass 7 Bell Units, Washington Post, Oct. 27, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
The General Accounting Office, in August of 1986, published a Report to the Congress discussing, inter alia, the extent and reasons for bypass, the impact bypass may
have on local exchange carriers' revenues, the current regulatory actions in place, and
options available to policymakers for addressing the bypass concerns. GAO's statistical evidence as to the degree of bypass was based on interviews with 82 representative
large-volume telephone users in the states of Colorado and Massachusetts. GAO's statistical survey indicated that as many as 82 percent of large-volume telephone company customers either are presently bypassing their local exchange companies or are
considering such plans.
313. The Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users Committee survey on expenditures
and use, compiled by Economics and Technology, Inc., showed that 75 percent of the
respondents used some privately-owned dedicated connections (that is, non-public
network facilities) or facilities. The study survey showed that at the time the survey
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The FCC and state regulatory commissions are rapidly removing regulatory barriers to competitive entry in the local exchange telecommunications services. For example, numerous
resellers and large businesses are providing several aspects of
exchange telecommunications service through various methods. The typical methods include the provision of PBX switching, shared telecommunications services, private line services,
institutional cable services, digital termination services, FM
side band services, and other similar services all of which have
been authorized by the FCC or by state regulators to provide
local telecommunications distribution services. a 4
Thus, the line-of-business restrictions essentially operate on
erroneous assumptions, and protect giant integrated competitors which do not need such protections. At the same time they
are anticompetitive in preventing new entrants-the RBOCsinto various segments of the information industry. AT&T,
which is three times larger than any single RBOC, can manufacture both CPE and telecommunications equipment for its
own use as well as for other service providers and customers,
can require that its CPE and telecommunications services be
provided with equipment which it manufactures, and can obtain all of the economic and marketplace advantages of vertical
integration and one-stop shopping. Also, AT&T (in addition to
other integrated competitors such as GTE and the IBM Group)
can and does compete with the individual BOCs for the provision of local exchange telecommunications services on a fully
integrated basis. Thus, the notion that even an RBOC fully intent on impeding competition could materially harm industry
giants is simply not realistic, even if such an interest could be
demonstrated.3 1 5
was conducted, 13 percent of the respondents had the purchase or expansion of privately-owned facilities under serious consideration. The survey indicated that 75 percent of the customers responding used privately-owned facilities to interconnect with
switched interexchange facilities. See ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY, INC. AD HOC
TELECOMMUNICATIONS USERS COMMITTEE SURVEY ON EXPENDITURES AND USAGE,

Ta-

ble 2, Use of Privately-Owned Facilities (August, 1986).
314. See generally Second Bypass Report, supra note 308 Appendix 5 at 13-17.
315. It must be remembered that even the allegations that the integrated AT&T
engaged in anticompetitive conduct in the lawsuit were not proven. The MFJ was
agreed to before AT&T had completed its defense.
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VIII

Conclusion
The MFJ's line-of-business restrictions effectively constitute
a complex system of behavioral regulations inconsistent with
the structural remedies originally pursued by the Department
of Justice in the lawsuit. These restrictions are predicated on
contradictory and faulty assumptions which misperceive the
nature of the telecommunications marketplace in general, and,
more importantly, which rely on the erroneous premise that a
viable market exists which can be served by a company which
does nothing more than provide exchange telecommunications
services. Moreover, the line-of-business restrictions supplant
national telecommunications regulatory policy entrusted by
statute to the FCC, which has enacted detailed rules dealing
with precisely the markets and competitive concerns addressed
by the MFJ.
The issue which policymakers and the judiciary must now
face is how to return control over national telecommunications
policy to a governmental agency with the jurisdiction and resources to make the decisions necessary to protect the public.
The FCC has the necessary authority and resources to perform
this function-and has expressly been delegated this authority
by statute. The line-of-business restrictions and the equal access injunction are regulatory and policy matters which are
within the FCC's direct jurisdiction and the FCC has acted to
address the policy issues at stake in these areas via the regulatory process. The MFJ's restrictions are simply unnecessary
and anticompetitive.
In fact, several congressional proposals to return jurisdiction
over these information industry regulatory matters to the FCC
are now pending.3 16 Furthermore, the FCC clearly has the authority to overrule the MFJ's provisions when it finds that the
MFJ conflicts with the FCC's ability to carry out its statutory
mandate3 17 and it has exercised this authority on one
316. S. 2565, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) 132 CONG REC. S.7744 (daily ed. June 18,

1986); H.R. 3800, 99th CONG., 2d. Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H441 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1986).
317. See In the Matter of the Consolidated Application of American Tel. & Tel.
Co. and Specialized Bell System Companies for Authorization under §§ 214 and
310(d) of the Communications Act, 96 F.C.C.2d 18, paras. 67-71 at 45-47 (1983).
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occasion.3 18
The Department of Justice is due to report to the district
court supervising the MFJ in January 1987 on which, if any,
line-of-business restrictions should be retained. The myriad
possible remedies to the untenable situation which now exists
raise complex legal issues beyond the scope of this article. Regardless of how they are resolved, the dual regulation of the
telecommunications marketplace which now exists must cease.

318. See In the Matter of MTS and WATS Market Structure, Memorandum Opinion and Order, F.C.C. 86-176, para. 24 (released May 1, 1986).
[Ed. Note: The report was filed on Monday, February 2, 1987, Report and Recommendations of the United States Concerning the Line-of-Business Restrictions Imposed on the Bell Operating Companies by the Modification of Final Judgment,
United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. Filed Feb. 2, 1987)].

